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INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2002, the Indonesian national newspaper, Tempo, re-
ported that a group of mainly foreign-owned mining companies had
threatened to launch international arbitration against the government of
Indonesia (GOI).' The article reported that the threat was in reaction to a
ban on the practice of open-pit mining in protected forests (hutan
lindung) and listed twenty-three of the approximately one hundred and
fifty mining companies with operations and/or undeveloped mining ex-
ploration contracts or "Contracts of Work" (CoWs) in protected forests.2
Six months later, on October 7, the Jakarta Post reported that the Indo-
nesian House of Representatives (DPR) and Ministry of Forestry had
"agreed in principle" to change the forest designation in the locations of
three of twenty-three companies listed in the April 3 article from "pro-
tected" to "production" forests (thereby exempting them from the ban);
had clarified that three more companies' operations had never been lo-
cated within a "protection forest"; and assured the remaining fifteen
companies that their situation would be assessed in due time.' On Octo-
ber 10, the Minister of Forestry went further and expressed his
willingness to reconsider the ban altogether.4
1. Hutan Lindung Ancam Indonesia ke A rbitrase Internasional, KORAN TEMPO, Apr. 3,
2002, available at http://www.pili.or.id/news/20O2/indonesia/incl5_4b.html#HutanLindung
(last visited Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Hutan Lindung]. The law in question is Undang-
Undang No. 41 Tahun 1999 Tentang Kehutanan (Law No. 41, b1999 Regarding Forestry),
available at http://www.menlh.go.id/berita/f_berita.htm (official) (last visited Apr. 7, 2003)
[hereinafter BFL of 1999]. The offending provision is Passal (art.) 38(4), which states simply
"Pada kawasan hutan lindung dilarang melakukan penambangan dengan pola pertambangan
terbuka.," ("Open-pit mining is forbidden within the borders of protected forests.") (unofficial
translation by author).
2. Hutan Lindung, supra note 1.
3. Rendi A. Witular, 6 Mining Firms Can Resume Operations in Forest Areas,
JAKARTA POST, Oct. 7, 2002, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/
Archives2.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). The article relates comments by a GOI official that
one operation in dispute, Citra Palu, owned by Australian mining company Rio Tinto was
denied approval to resume on the basis of local opposition. However, the article goes on to
relate comments by Rio Tinto to the effect that it was no longer interested in continuing the
operation anyway.
4. Moch N. Kurniawan, Review of Mining Ban in Protected Forests Possible: Minister,
JAKARTA POST, Oct. 10, 2002, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/
Archives2.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
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The exact relationship between mining companies' threats of
international arbitration and the GOI's decision to repeal the ban cannot
be conclusively determined. However, GOI statements issued directly
following the threat indicate a causal connection. On June 14, 2002, the
GOI Environmental Minister stated, "[t]here were investment activities
before the Forestry Act was effective. If shut down, investors demand
compensation and Indonesia cannot pay [sic]."' He further stated that the
Indonesian government had two options, allow the mining to go ahead or
pay a fine.6 One month later, at a special hearing on the issue at the DPR
only the Minister of Forestry remained firm on the ban.7 The other four
ministers present all voiced support for allowing mining to continue in
protected forests, stating their fears of international arbitration by mining
companies if they did not.' In addition, several other factors connect the
threat to the GOI's ultimate decision.9
This series of events raises a number of questions and concerns.
However, the most fundamental question, and the one which underlies
this Note's various discussions, regards the basis of the mining compa-
nies' threat. An article by a foreign consultant in the Indonesian mining
industry, Clive Aspinal, presents the best indication of an answer.'° Ac-
cording to Aspinal, the very low mineral discovery ratio in an average
5. Nabiel Makarim Agrees with Mining in Protected Forests, KORAN TEMPO, June 14,
2002 (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (JATAM) transi.), available at
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press46.htm (last visited Apr.7, 2003).
6. Id.
7. JATAM, Update on Indonesian Government Positions on Mining in Protected Areas
15 July 2002, JATAM e-mail newsletter received by author July 15, 2002 (based on a report
prepared by Aminuddin, a JATAM member who attended the meeting) (on file with author).
8. Those voicing support for repealing the ban were the Coordinating Minister of the
Economy, the Minister of the Environment, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources,
and the Minister of Acceleration of Development of Eastern Areas. Id.
9. Additional elements connecting the threat and the GOI's decision include: the un-
precedented speed at which the government took action on the issue after two years of
inaction in the face of mining company complaints regarding the law; the exact coincidence
between the companies listed in the article reporting the threat and those which have already
been granted relief or which will be soon; and the timing of the reversal all weigh heavily
toward the conclusion that the threat plays a significant role in the process. One of the instru-
ments on which the threat was likely based, the ASEAN MIT, allows qualified investors to
bring international arbitration if, after six months of negotiation, an agreement with the host-
State has not been reached. Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the
Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore,
and the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, entered into
force Dec. 14-15, 1987, art. X(2), 27 I.L.M. 596 (1988) [hereinafter ASEAN MIT]. The time
between the first report of the threat on April 3, see Hutan Lindung, supra note 1, and the
report of the deal on October 7, see Witular, supra note 3, was just over six months.
10. See Clive Aspinal, Indonesian Mining Risk Analysis: The Realities of Forestry Law
41/1999, Protected Forests, and Downsizing of the Regulated Mining Industry, CLIVE ASPINAL
REP. (English ed.) No. IMRA 4/2001, May 20, 2001, available at http://www.minergynews.
com/opinion/aspinal28mei0l.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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CoW requires the holder of a CoW to invest millions to search for min-
erals, which can only then be recouped by employing open-pit mining
techniques to extract the minerals discovered." Thus, Aspinal continues,
the ban effectively cancels the affected CoWs, by making their perform-
ance economically unfeasible for their holders.' 2 Aspinal further
complains that the GOI imposed the ban unilaterally without negotiating
with affected companies, and that protected forest boundaries are uncer-
tain.'
3
All CoWs concluded since the mid-1970s contain arbitration
clauses. However, neither of the two claims suggested by Aspinal's
comments above could have been successfully maintained on the basis
of such clauses. These clauses refer to disputes arising out of the re-
spective CoW, but the ban on open-pit mining in no way arises out of the
CoW; it is perfectly distinct from the CoW.'5 Only if CoWs contained
what are known as "stabilization clauses," guaranteeing that the GOI
would not enact environmental regulations which affect the mining com-
panies' operations, could these claims have arisen out of the contract.' 6 In
fact, however, the exact opposite is true.' 7 Since 1974 all CoWs have in-
cluded clauses explicitly requiring that mining companies obey and
modify their operations so as to obey all applicable environmental regu-
lations."'
11. Id.
12. Aspinal analogizes the ban on open-pit mining to a situation where commercial
fishermen are only allowed to fish in the ocean using one centimeter hooks rather than the
standard five, ten, or twenty-five centimeter hooks needed to catch the "big fish," and asks
"[hiave these [CoWs] now been broken by the Republic of Indonesia? If so, is the government
going to reimburse regulated CoW companies?" Id.
13. Id.
14. See Hoediatmo Hoed, Legal Aspects of Contract of Work 122-23, Presented at
Indonesian Mining Conference, Jakarta, Nov. 1997, reproduced in INDONESIAN MINING: INTO
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 115 (Indonesian Mining Ass'n 1997); see also, e.g., Contract of Work
concluded December 22, 1995 between GOI and Pt. International Nickel Indonesia, art. 17
(copy in Bahasa, Indonesia, on file with author) [hereinafter Inco CoW]; Aspinal, supra note
10.
15. See Inco CoW, supra note 14, art. 17.
16. See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Com-
mitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 220
(1996).
17. CoWs do contain stabilization clauses. However, these clauses apply only to the
financial terms of the contract rather than to applicable environmental regulation. See Hoed,
supra note 14, at 125.
18. MARGUERITE MARIOUN MANSHRECK, TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL AGREEMENTS IN
THE THIRD WORLD, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDONESIA 31 (Menoire pour Insititut Uni-
versitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva 1982); see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra
note 14, art. 22 ("Perusahaan wajib sesuasai dengan undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan
lingkungan hidup ...." [Operations must conform to environmental protection laws and regu-
lations .... ]). As will be discussed below this clause also creates serious problems for any
expropriation claim that the mining companies might mount.
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The Indonesian Foreign Investment Law of 1967 (FIL of 1967),
which regulates the admission and operation of all foreign investment in
Indonesia, provides an even weaker basis for such a claim.' 9 The law
gives foreign investors only a very limited right to compel arbitration to
determine appropriate levels of compensation for "total nationaliza-
tion/revocation of ownership rights of foreign capital enterprises.
20
Under even the most liberal interpretation, the actions by the GOI do not
rise to such a level. Rather, Aspinal's comments suggest a claim alleging
what has come to be known as "indirect expropriation" and a breach of
fair and equitable treatment guarantees.
21
The exact constitution of a compensible indirect expropriation or a
breach of a guarantee of fair and equitable treatment resists easy or short
definition and thus is discussed in detail below. 2  However, at their most
basic level, indirect expropriation and breaches of fair and equitable
treatment claims involve an allegation of improper interference with a
foreign investment by the host-States, which negatively affect the in-
vestment's value. 3 The most likely basis for these types of claims is
provisions contained in modem international investment agreements
(IIAs), both multilateral investment treaties (MITs) and bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs). In light of the "nationalities" of the investors who
most immediately benefited from the GOI's decisions related above,24 the
19. Undang-Undang No. 1 Tahun 1967 Tentang Penanaman Modal Asing (Law No. I
of 1967 Concerning Foreign Investment) arts. 21-22 [hereinafter FIL of 1967], available at
http://www.bkpm.go.id/bkpm/laws-uul 1967.php?mode=baca&catinfo-id=l (official) (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003) (official English translation available at http://www.bkpm.go.id/
bkpm/govregl11967.php?mode=baca&catinfoid=1).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES 98-102 (1995); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
282-83 (1994); see also Aspinal, supra note 10.
22. See infra Parts III and IV.
23. For competing definitions see SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 282; DOLZER & STE-
VENS, supra note 21, at 98-102.
24. See Witular, supra note 3. The applicable nationality of ownership in those opera-
tions is as follows: PT Weda Bay Nikel (Maluku): majority, Weda Bay Minerals Pty Ltd
(Australian) wholly owned subsidiary of Weda Bay Minerals (Canadian); PT Nusa Halmahera
(Maluku): majority, Newcrest (Australian); PT Gag Nikel (Papua): majority, BHP Billiton
(Australian); PT Galuh Cempaka (South Kalimantan): 40 percent, Ashton MMC (Singapore)
recently sold to Rio Tinto (Australian/British); PT Jorong Barutama (Papua): majority, Banpu
(Thai); PT Barisan Tropical Mining (South Sumatra): majority, Laverton Gold NL (Austra-
lian). It is also interesting to note that the four other operations specifically mentioned by
name in the article as being under consideration for a similar waiver also have investors pro-
tected by the BITs or MIT in question: PT Westralian Atan Minerals (E. Kalimantan):
majority, Westralian (Australian); PT Kelian Equatorial Mining (E Kalimantan): majority, Rio
Tinto (Australian/British); PT Meares Soputan Mining (North Sulawesi): majority, Aurora
Gold (Australian); PT Arutmin Indonesia (South Kalimantan): majority, BHP Billiton (Austra-
lian). Information gathered from the various websites of the listed companies.
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specific instrumehts, on which the threat was based, are most likely the
Australia and Indonesia Bilateral Investment Treaty (Aus-Indo BIT),25
the United Kingdom and Indonesia Bilateral Investment Treaty (UK-
Indo BIT),26 and the ASEAN MIT.
2 7
In recent years Canadian and U.S. investors have brought a series of
such claims against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
State parties under article 1105 (fair and equitable treatment) and article
1110 (expropriation) of the NAFTA Chapter 11 investor provisions.28 A
number of claims brought under these provisions have demanded com-
pensation for losses allegedly suffered by investors as the result of
host-State environmental regulation, including a ban on the importation
29
and interprovincial transport of certain types of gasoline additives, a
licensing refusal for a toxic waste dump and subsequent establishment of
a nature reserve, 30 an export ban on PCB tainted waste,31 and a ban on the
use of the chemical gas additive MBTE.32
While not all of these claims have been completely successful,"
other claimants have received significant awards on their basis either at
settlement or at the hands of an arbitral panel' 4 The success of these
25. Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 17,
1992, Austl.-Indon., 1770 U.N.T.S. 301 (1994) [hereinafter Aus-Indo BIT].
26. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 27, 1976, U.K.-
N.Ir.-Indon., 1074 U.N.T.S. 195 (1978) [hereinafter UK-Indo BIT].
27. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, 27 I.L.M. 596. For a complete list of BITs to which
Indonesia is a party, see http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/indonesia.htm.
28. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, Can.-Mex-U.S., arts.
1105, 1110, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See, e.g., Feldman v. Mexico, Award,
Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ARB(AF)/99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002) [hereinafter
Feldman Award]; Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Award on Jurisdiction,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA (Aug, 7, 2002) [hereinafter Methanex Award on Jurisdiction]; Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits, UNCITRAL/NAFTA (Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter
Pope & Talbot Award on Merits]; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA (Nov. 13, 2000) [hereinafter S.D. Myers Award on Merits]; Metalclad
Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes,
ARB(AF)/97/l (Sept. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad Award] (partially annulled in United
States of Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 0664); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,
Interim Award, UNCITRAL/NAFrA (June 26, 2000) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Interim
Award]; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, UNCITRAL/NAFTA (June 24, 1998)
[hereinafter Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction]. The text of all of the NAFTA Chapter 11 decisions
mentioned in this Note as well as supporting documents and similar for other Chapter 11
claims, are available at www.naftalaw.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
29. See Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28, para. 5.
30. See Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 1.
31. See S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 123.
32. See Methanex Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28, para. 22
33. See, e.g., S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 288; Methanex Award
on Jurisdiction, supra note 28, para. 172.
34. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Notice of Settlement, Int'l Centre for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes (Sept. 10, 1997); Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 131.
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claims is quite worrying to some observers, who believe that they con-
tradict the widely held and long-standing "polluter pays" principle in
international environmental law.35 In addition to the strong normative
objections which such people would have to this kind of reversal, many
worry that just the threat of such liability will lead countries to forego
needed environmental and social legislation that might negatively affect
the value of foreign investment, rather than risk potential liability, which
is sometimes referred to as "regulatory chill."36 In fact, such worries were
among the reasons why the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
negotiations at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) ended in failure.37
However, the potential for such claims, and their implications for
host-State regulatory freedom are not isolated to claims under NAFTA
Chapter 11 or any renewed effort to negotiate the MAI. The provisions
of Chapter 1 1 were drawn directly from the U.S. Model BIT.38 The terms
of the U.S. Model BIT in turn closely parallel provisions in each of the
three instruments referenced above, as well as provisions contained in
over eighteen hundred BITs and another handful of MITs in force in na-
tions all over the world.39 In addition to substantive provisions, the
instruments also often mirror provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11 which
35. See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS:
A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTMENT RIGHTS 31 (2001).
36. See id. at 32. Developing countries like Indonesia are the most vulnerable to such
claims (or threats based upon them) and have the most to lose from them. This is due to the
fact that many indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims grow out of in-
vestor expectations which have been allegedly violated by changes in the host country
regulatory environment. Thus, if, as is often the case in the developing world, a country has a
weak regulatory environment the baseline of investor expectations will be quite low and easily
violated. Of course, this same regulatory weakness creates the greatest need for new regula-
tions. Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law (CIEL), The Multilateral Agreement on Investment's Potential
Impact on Environmental Law in Developing Countries 10 (1998) (discussion draft on file
with author); see also U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), TAKING OF PROP-
ERTY 15 (2000) (discussing the potential for governments to forego environmental regulation
due to the threat of challenge by investors).
37. See, e.g., Special Comm. on the Multilateral Agreement on Inv., 1998 Leg. Sess., 3d
Sess., 36th Parliament (B.C.) at 381, 388, 389, 395, 415, 424 (Oct. 15, 1998), available at
http://www.legis.gov.bc.ca/cmt/36thParl/mai/hansard/tl2_1015.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
38. See Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Stevens, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing
the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (2001);
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text; see also United States of America-Model
Agreement, in DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 241.
39. The applicable provisions in each of the three instruments closely parallel the for-
mulation used in the U.K. Model BIT, which differs only slightly from the U.S. Model BIT.
See, e.g., Great Britain-Model Agreement, arts. 2(2), 5(1), in DOLZER & STEVENS, supra
note 21, at 228; Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, arts. 1(2), VI; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, arts.
IV(3), VI(l); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, arts. 3, 5(1). See Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv.
Disputes website, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm, for a
complete list by country of concluded BITs.
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provide for arbitration of disputes between investors and host-States at
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
an autonomous international organization established under the Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the Washington Convention (ICSID)).40 Fil-
ings at ICSID have increased from a level of approximately one per year
in the 1980s to one or two per month in 2001.4' Given secrecy rules gov-
erning filings and proceedings, it is difficult to know the precise nature
of these claims.42 However, anecdotal evidence points to claims based
upon BITs, alleging expropriation and/or breaches of fair and equitable
treatment, with a preponderance of the latter.43 Thus, it may be that we
are witnessing the beginning of what William D. Rogers, senior trade
and arbitration partner at Arnold & Porter, predicted would be "a flood
of litigation under the BITs."
A number of structural factors, which are beyond the immediate
scope of this Note, may influence less wealthy countries to cave in to
investor threats of arbitration, as Indonesia appears to have done here.
40. See NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 1120; Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(1966) [hereinafter Washington Convention (ICSID)]. Investors and governments from States
that are not party to the Washington Convention (ICSID) are still able to bring claims at ICSID
under what is known as the Additional Facility. As neither Mexico nor Canada are parties to
the Washington Convention (ICSID), it is under that facility that all NAFTA Chapter II claims
heard at ICSID are brought. However, being a party to the Washington Convention (ICSID)
has advantages (or disadvantages, depending on your perspective) independent of access to
ICSID arbitration, particularly internalized system award review which excludes domestic
court involvement, id. art. 52, as well as similar provisions regarding enforcement, id. art. 54.
41. Luke Peterson, Change Investment Litigation, Bit by BIT in BRIDGES BETWEEN
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 5 (May 2001) (quoting speech by William D.
Rogers, at the Inter-American Development Bank Conference, Oct. 26-27, 2000), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade inv-litigation.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
42. Id. (stating, however, that most information points to claims that "target key areas
of public policy such as water, energy, environment, and health.")
43. In the 2002 Yearbook of International Arbitration alone, five ICSID decisions were
reported. Four were based on BIT claims, of which three alleged breaches of fair and equitable
treatment provisions. Maffenzini v. Kingdom of Spain, Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes, ARB/97f7 (Nov. 13, 2000), reported in 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Maffenzini Award]; A.S. Genin v. Estonia, Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv.
Disputes, ARB/99/2 (June 25, 2001), reported in 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 61 (2002) [hereinafter
Genin Award]; Mihaly v. Sri Lanka, Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes,
ARB/00/2 (Mar. 15, 2002), reported in 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 84 (2002) [hereinafter Mihaly
Award]. The other alleged expropriation: Olguin v. Paraguay, Award, Int'l Centre for Settle-
ment of Inv. Disputes, ARB/98/5 (Aug. 8, 2000), reported in 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 48 (2002)
[hereinafter Olguin Award]. Compare that with just five years before when not a single ICSID
case was reported in that year's Yearbook.
44. Peterson, supra note 41 (quoting comments made at a conference of attorneys prac-
ticing in international arbitration).
45. Briefly, these factors include the disproportionate impact of potential multimillion
dollar awards resulting from such claims, a lack of capacity among developing countries to
[Vol. 24:893
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However, their hesitancy to fight may also be based, in part, on an in-
adequate understanding of the applicable law, which allows investors to
inordinately influence host-State decisions through threats of arbitration
that have little or no chance of success. In regard to the mining compa-
nies' threat, this at least appears to be the case. As this Note will
demonstrate, the GOI could have likely beaten the mining companies'
claims at a preliminary/jurisdictional phase, and certainly on the merits.
In order to show this, the Note first places the mining companies'
claim in context, both to give the reader a sense of what is at stake as
well to establish the basic facts necessary for the arguments which fol-
low. The Note next discusses the object and purpose of the three
instruments, distinguishing them from the object and purpose which tri-
bunals commonly ascribe to NAFTA Chapter 11. Following this
discussion, the Note examines each of the arguments which the GOI
could raise to defeat the claim at a preliminary/jurisdictional level and on
the merits, respectively Part III and Part IV. The Note concludes with a
discussion of various treaty mechanisms which the GOI could employ
proactively to lessen the potential impact of any subsequent similar
threats by investors. It is hoped that this discussion will provide a guide
for groups, individuals, and governments which find themselves oppos-
ing these sorts of threats, and possibly in the process contribute in a
small way to dispelling some of their inordinate strength. 6
fight well-financed claimants, and structural elements like the lack of an effective appeal and
predictability in adjudication. See infra notes 361-66.
46. It should be noted at the outset that the GOI may not be inclined to raise some of
the arguments suggested, particularly those related to aspects of official corruption by GOI
officials. However, the opportunity may well exist for interested individuals and organizations
to participate as friends of the court or amici. While there has not yet been a BIT or non-
NAFTA arbitration proceeding at which non-parties were allowed as friends of the court to
submit briefs amicus curiae, or give oral evidence, the power of an arbitral tribunal to accept
such briefs has recently been affirmed in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 claims. Methanex,
Inc. v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to
Intervene as "Amici Curiae." UNCITRAI/NAFTA, para. 47 (Jan. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Methanex Amicus Award]. The tribunal in this case based its ruling in large part on the ab-
sence of any provision either in NAFTA Chapter 11 or the UNCITRAL Rules which forbade
them from accepting such submission, id. para. 24, and the grant of broad discretionary pow-
ers to the tribunal over the procedures by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 15 (1), id. para.
26. There is similarly no provision in any of the instant three instruments which forbids such
actions by the tribunal. While all but the ASEAN MIT, which gives the parties a choice of
rules to apply at arbitration, ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2), require that ICSID Rules of
Procedure apply rather than UNCITRAL rules, Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(2)(b);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1), ICSID Rules of Procedure give as much or more dis-
cretion to an arbitral panel constituted under it. See ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS: RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, ICSID Doc./15, R. 19 (1995) [hereinafter ICSID
ARBITRATION RULES] ("The Tribunal shall make orders for the conduct of the proceedings."),
available at www.wordlbank.org/ICSID. In the context of other international economic adju-
dication, the Appellate Body of the WTO has also now strongly affirmed the authority of
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I. THE INDONESIAN ENVIRONMENT
The conflict between mining companies and the current GOI can be
understood in some ways as a political hangover from the natural re-
source policies of the Suharto administration. Diplomatic estimations of
the Suharto regime's natural resource policies describe it as top-down,
benefiting a small group of elite in the nation's capital while routinely
denying the rights and concerns of those living closest to the resources
exploited. 47 The least diplomatic (or most honest, depending on your per-
spective) describe the system as rife with official corruption, rule
breaking, and illegality which benefited a tiny minority of well-
connected elite while causing enormous ecological and social disruption
48in resource rich areas.
During this period the GOI paid lip service to environmental con-
cerns and their social implications, creating a system of regulations
which looked quite impressive on paper but which were routinely ig-
WTO panels and appellate bodies to accept amicus curiae submissions from the general pub-
lic. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel,
WT/DSI83/AB/R, para. 41 (2000). The authority to choose to hear oral submissions has not
yet been affirmed in the context of NAFTA Chapter II or WTO dispute resolution, and it may
be more difficult in light of secrecy rules which pertain to both settings. See UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, art. 25(4); Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization,
Dec. 15, 1993, annex 2, Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994). However, many of the same issues regarding democratic
legitimacy which informed the decisions in both contexts to accept written submissions apply
to oral submissions, especially in a situation like the instant one where many of the interested
parties cannot be legitimately assumed to have functional literacy in any of the ICSID's offi-
cial languages and for whom the issue of open-pit mining pollution is quite serious. In
addition, certain aspects of the ICSID Arbitration Rules differing from the UNCITRAL or the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding suggest the discretionary authority of a tribunal or-
ganized under them to allow such oral evidence. See ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra, R.
15(1) (requiring the "deliberations" of the tribunal remain secret, with no explicit similar
requirement regarding proceedings) (emphasis added); id. R. 34(2) (giving the tribunal the
authority at any point in the proceeding to call upon the parties to produce witnesses and ex-
perts); id. R. 34(1) (giving the tribunal the general authority to "judge the admissibility of any
evidence adduced and of its probative value."). But see id. R. 32(2) (making tribunals' deci-
sions regarding the attendance of hearings by third parties subject to the consent of both
parties).
47. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, INDONESIA: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION, at ii, 1, 24. (2001), available at
http://lnweb 18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/Indonesia+Environmental+Report/$Fil
e/Indonesia+ENVNRM+Transition-entire.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
48. See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), INDONESIAN NATURAL RESOURCES AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT, ASIA REPORT No. 29, at i-3, 22 (2000) [hereinafter ICG REPORT], available at
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=517 (last visited Apr. 7,
2003); FOREST WATCH INDONESIA-WORLD RES. INST.-GLOBAL FOREST WATCH, THE STATE OF
THE FOREST: INDONESIA 23 (2002) [hereinafter STATE OF THE FOREST].
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nored and/or left unenforced on the ground.49 It also maintained strict
control over the admission of foreign capital and its conduct once admit-
ted, especially in the area of mining. The GOI's motions in the direction
of environmental conservation were likely done mainly in order to ap-
pease donor demands.5 ° However, the' government's strict control over
investment and mining reflected a concern for the maintenance of sover-
eignty and control over its natural wealth which has informed Indonesian
natural resource policy since its creation as an independent nation state."1
Foreign mining companies were able to operate in this environment
to their great benefit.52 Internal contradictions that permeated the system
were dealt with through close relationships with central power brokers
who prioritized the development of the Indonesian mining industry over
all other concerns and who often had a personal stake in its success."
However, an "endemic" conflict between protection forestry and mining
operations in Indonesia existed. After the overthrow of the Suharto re-
gime the forces of reform attempted to begin resolving this conflict
through measures such as the ban on open-pit mining. As will be shown,
the mining companies' investments were always subject to this eventual-
ity, and by the terms of the instruments on which those investments were
based, as well as laws governing all foreign investment in Indonesia, it
was a risk they were forced to bear.
A. Environmental and Social Concerns
Indonesian forests currently are the third largest expanse in the
world 5 and are home to 10 percent of the world's flowering plants, 12
percent of its mammal species, 16'percent of its reptiles and amphibians,
and 17 percent of its birds. 6 In addition, estimates of the number of peo-
ple depending upon them range as high as 65 million.5" At the current
rate of deforestation, 1.7 million hectares a year, all lowland forests on
49. See WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at 23-26, 33, 38, 44; STATE OF THE FOREST,
supra note 48, at 27-29, 66-67.
50. See STATE OF THE FOREST, supra note 48, at 66.
51. See infra Section I.B.
52. For example, in 2001 Rio Tinto shareholders realized a net income of $127.1 mil-
lion on operations of the Grasberg mine alone. See http://www.fcx.com/ir/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003).
53. See WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at vi.
54. See id. at 76.
55. ICG REPORT, supra note 48, at 3.
56. WILLIAM THIESENHUESEN ET AL., SOURCES OF LAND TENURE CONFLICT IN INDO-
NESIA 4 (Report commissioned by USAID-Indonesia 1997) (citing World Bank statistics).
57. STATE OF THE FOREST, supra note 48, at 3.
Spring 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
the island of Sumatra will be lost by 2005 and all lowland forests in Ka-
limantan by 2010, leaving only the lowland forests of Papua."
In open-pit mining, enormous pits, sometimes encompassing an en-
tire mountain, are excavated to remove subsurface minerals. The process
involves "massive land clearings" which usually displace and/or destroy
large quantities of flora and fauna. 9 Once established, such mines create
long-term, high risks for the local environment and downstream commu-
nities of severe water resource poisoning and pollution from spills,
erosion, and what is known as acid rock drainage (ARD). 60 ARD is a
highly toxic by-product of open-pit mining, which is created when mine
tailings oxidize in holding ponds, resulting in a highly acidic solution
that is deadly to all living things and virtually impossible to prevent from
escaping into local watersheds. 6' According to the World Bank the effects
of ARD in an area "can last for decades or even for centuries." 2
B. Forestry Law
The source of the endemic conflict between open-pit mining and
protection forestry, is the complete incompatibility of the two activities.
Pursuant to the Spatial Planning Law of 1992 and Law No. 41, b1999
Regarding Forestry (BFL of 1999) forest areas in Indonesia are divided
into three functional zones: conservation, production, and protected for-
58. WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at ii.
59. Dadan Wijaksan & Musthofid, Open-Pit Mines Endanger Lives, Nature, JAKARTA
POST, Sept. 21, 2002, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/Archives2.asp (last
visited Nov. 7, 2002).
60. See WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at 53-79. In areas downriver from the Barisan
gold and silver mine in South Sumatra, one of the six mines recently granted a waiver from
the open-pit mining ban, indigenous communities and OXFAM investigators have documented
an almost complete destruction of their local river environments since the mine opened in
1986. The community formerly counted on the river for a number of purposes including
commercial and subsistence fishing, cooking, drinking, washing, and small-scale pan mining
activities. Since the mine opened however there has been a steady drop off in the fish popula-
tion of local waterways punctuated by frequent large-scale fish kills. In addition, due to
mining pollution the river is now not only unsuitable for human consumption, but in fact is so
toxic that it leads to severe skin rashes in people who come in contact with its water, and has
even been blamed for the death of one young girl. Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, Case 3:
Barsian Gold Mine, available at www.caa.org.au/campaigns/mining/ombudsman/
2001/barisan.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003); see also OWEN LYNCH, WHOSE RESOURCES?
WHOSE COMMON GOOD? TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE
NATIONAL INTEREST IN INDONESIA 40 (2002) (describing the safety hazards to local commu-
nities created by the tailings of the Freeport McMoRan Mine and the U.S. government's
decision to cancel the project's political risk insurance as a result); id. at 68 (describing the
effects on communities downstream from the Kelian Gold mine, including, elimination of
drinking water source, elimination of fish production, and skin lesions, rashes, and stomach
aches experienced by those who bathed in the river).




ests.63 According to their functional definition, "protected forests are for-
ests with the main function of protecting life-supporting systems for
hydrology, preventing floods, controlling erosion, preventing sea water
intrusion and maintaining soil fertility."6 The environmental risks of
open-pit mining directly implicate these functions of protected forests .
During the Suharto regime this contradiction was dealt with essen-
tially through a wink and a nod, whereby lands designated as protected
forests were "loaned for use" (pinjam pakai) as mining areas with the
"promise" that they would be restored and returned after their use as the
location of a mine was complete.66 The record of successful reclamations
is very poor.6 7 However, even if reclamation consistently occurred, the
marine polluting characteristics of open-pit mining would still directly
implicate the functional definitions of protected forests during their op-
eration and afterwards.68
In light of these dire ecological consequences, the total ban on open-
pit mining in protected forests was an appropriate and logical solution to
the problem. It grew out of, and reflects, the unprecedented political
freedom which accompanied the fall of the Suharto regime and the cor-
ollary effort by the Indonesian people to align their country's natural
resource policies more rationally and equitably.69 It also is directly in line
with Indonesia's international obligations, 7 and within the body of risks
that foreign mining companies not only should have expected as
63. Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 1992 Tentang Penataan Ruang (Law No. 24 of 1992
Concerning Spatial Use Management) art. 7, available at http://www.menlh.go.id/
peraturan/uu/uu2492/ (official) (last visited Apr. 4, 2003); BFL of 1999, supra note 1, art.
6(l)(a)-(c).
64. BFL of 1999, supra note 1, art. 1(8) (translation by author).
65. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
66. See WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at 76.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 53-79.
69. See JUAN SEVE, A REVIEW OF FOREST SECTOR POLICY ISSUES IN INDONESIA 2 (July
1999) (Technical Report produced for the USAID-Indonesia and GOI collaboration, Natural
Resource Management Program); STATE OF THE FOREST, supra note 48, at 66.
70. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), arts. 8, 10(d), June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD] (obliga-
tion to take efforts to protect the natural environments of endangered and threatened species
through the creation and maintenance of protected areas; and obligations to protect and en-
courage customary uses of natural resources by local communities, respectively); International
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (1969) [hereinafter CERD]; Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples, annex V, U.N.Doc.
A/52/18 (1997) (obligations to protect the traditional land and other natural resources of
indigenous minorities from environmental destruction); Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, art. 24, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (1990) (obligations to protect the health of
children from risks caused by environmental pollution).
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operators in a heavily regulated industry, but which they in fact con-
tracted to assume.'
C. Mining and Investment Law
Mining by foreign entities in Indonesia is a tightly regulated indus-
try, specifically controlled by article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of
Indonesia, article 8 of the FIL of 1967, and the Basic Mining Law of
1967 (BML).72 These various provisions reflect the GOI's jealous con-
cern for sovereignty over its natural resources, its long-standing policy of
conditional admittance and tight control of foreign investment, and ex-
plicitly assign the environmental costs and risks to mine operators. The
standard terms contained in every CoW embody this.73
Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution states that "[t]he land, the wa-
ters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the
State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people. 74 As two com-
mentators in the mining industry observed, "this formulation goes
beyond traditional affirmation," articulating, rather, a fundamental, invio-
lable precept of Indonesian constitutional law.7 Thus, CoWs resemble
traditional concession contracts only in some ways, such as the manner
in which revenue is transferred back to the State in the form of taxation
and royalties, and the level of control holders of CoWs have over opera-
tions. 6 However, in other important ways foreign mining companies act
not as concessionaires but as contractors for the Republic of Indonesia
(RI), which retains title to unextracted minerals, and for whom the min-
ing companies work.77
The BML contains basic provisions which give the Ministry of
Mines the authority to regulate mining and specific provisions regarding
the responsibility for CoW holders' responsibilities to compensate any-
one whose resource rights they disturb or destroy. However, the basic
rights and obligations of CoW holders as contractors for the State are
71. See, e.g., MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; Inco CoW, supra note 14, art. 22.
72. Hoed, supra note 14, at 120.
73. See id. The basic model has been changed seven times since the first was drafted in
1967; each model is referred to by the number of its generation (1st generation, 2nd genera-
tion, and so forth). WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at 53.
74. Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia (1945)] art. 33(3) (unofficial translation by author) [hereinafter INDON.
CONST], available at http://www.lin.go.id/detail.asp?idartcl= 1311 026XZA0001 &by=HukReg
(official) (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
75. MIRIAN K. OMALU & JESUS A. ZAMORA AGUIRRE, KEY ISSUES IN MINING POLICY:
A BRIEF COMPARATIVE SURVEY AS A BACKGROUND STUDY ON THE REFORM OF MINING LAW
26(1998).





contained within the standard terms of the CoWs. 78 Since 1974 those
terms have included an explicit requirement that foreign mining compa-
nies "conform" their operations to all applicable environmental
regulation and conduct themselves in the manner least destructive to the
environment.79 The plain meaning of "must conform to" or "wajib sesua-
sai" is prospective and it is apparent that CoW holders have understood
it this way. ° As new environmental regulations have been enacted CoW
holders have conformed their conduct accordingly, at times explicitly
articulating their legal responsibility to do so."' The ban on open-pit min-
ing was in this context simply another environmental regulation to which
the CoW holders were required to conform.
This maintenance of control by the GOI and conscious assignment
of risk and responsibility to the foreign investor, while particularly pro-
nounced in the context of mining, is common to all foreign investment in
Indonesia. The FIL of 1967 makes the establishment of any foreign
78. See Undang-Undang No. 11 Tahun 1967 Tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Per-
tambangan (Law No. II of 1967 Concerning the Basic Provisions of Mining), arts. 29, 25(1),
27(1), available at http://www.djgsm.esdm.go.id/peraturan/uu/l 1,20,in, l.html (official) (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter BML]. Article 29 provides: "The administration, supervision
of mining activities... are centralized with the Minister and further regulated by Government
Regulation... mainly involves labor safety, the supervision of the production and other activi-
ties in mining related with the public interest." Id. art. 29 (unofficial translation by author,
emphasis added); see FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 8(1) (requiring all mining operations by
foreign entities be done in cooperation with the government "on the basis of a work contract
[CoW]... or other form in accordance with prevailing regulations.") (emphasis added).
79. MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14, art. 22.
("Perusahaan wajib sesuasai dengan undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan lingkungan
hidup . [Operations must conform to environmental protection laws and regulations
... .]). It is important to note that while many commentators refer to the provision of lex spe-
cialis by CoWs which guarantee a level of stability of terms to the contract, see, e.g., Hoed,
supra note 14, at 121; Soetaryo Sigit, Mining Indonesia 1945-1995, in INDONESIAN MINING
Ass'N, MINING INDONESIA: FIrY YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1945-1995 (1996), these clauses
do not cancel the mining companies' obligation to conform to environmental regulations re-
quired elsewhere by the CoW but rather protect them from changes in the financial terms of
the contract. See Hoed, supra note 14, at 121.
80. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 132
(1975) ("2. to bring into agreement.").
81. See, e.g., 0. Samosir & Susanto Basu, Challenges in Environmental Management in
PT Inco, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF MINING IN INDONESIA 66, 71 (Marangin Simatu-
pang & Beni N. Wahju eds., 1994) (party to 1974 CoW describing efforts to comply with
provincial waste water regulations enacted in 1990); W.M. McIntosh & D. Michaelsen, Envi-
ronmental Management at PT Kaltim Prima Coal-An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
OF MINING IN INDONESIA, supra, at 77, 82 (party to 1982 CoW stating that they were "re-
quired to comply with a range of statutory environmental requirements" followed by a list of
regulations enacted in 1986, 1989, and 1990); Bruce E. Marsh, Environmental Planning,
Monitoring and Management PT Freeport Indonesia, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF MIN-
ING IN INDONESIA, supra, at 97, 97 (PT. Freeport Indonesia Environmental Manager, party to
1967 CoW, stating that environmental assessment documents were submitted in 1984 "to
ensure compliance with these new requirements" contained in laws enacted in 1982 and
1986).
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investment in Indonesia subject to specific approval by the GOI, accord-
ing to the conditions it sees fit, making clear "that the owner of the
capital directly bears the risk of the investment." 2 Once approved, the
investment is granted a license according to a number of conditions, the
license is revocable if the investment fails to comply with any of the
conditions."
As Sornarajah has noted, Indonesia's foreign investment law and
others like it do not so much create a right in the host-State to regulate
the establishment and conduct of foreign investment once established,
but rather affirm a right that already existed.84 According to rules of cus-
tomary international law, all nations have the authority to regulate the
entrance of foreign individuals into their country and to regulate the
conduct of such individuals once admitted; and a similar right to regulate
exists with regard to the establishment and conduct of foreign invest-
ment.85 Thus investments made in that territory and the rights of which
they consist are always subject to the right of the State to regulate their
operation.86 A law like Indonesia's simply reaffirms these rights. Thus,
even if specific terms of the CoWs, the BML, and the FL of 1967 did
not give the GOI the authority to regulate the operation of foreign min-
ing companies in Indonesia, and in particular, the right to regulate their
82. FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. I (assigning risk to the investor); id. art. 4 (giving
GOI authority to determine operating area); id. art. 5 (giving GOI general authority to deter-
mine fields of activity open to investors and conditions which must be met for each investment
admitted). This tight control over establishment, the explicit assignment of risk, and the condi-
tionality of admission arguably reflect a more general ambivalence in the Indonesian attitude
toward foreign investment that at times has viewed foreign investment as almost a necessary
evil. See HAL HILL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN INDONESIA 28 (1988).
Such ambivalence is apparent in the preamble of the FIL of 1967:
Considering ... that efforts to overcome economic decline and further develop our
economic potential should be based on the capabilities and capacities of the Indo-
nesian people themselves; that nevertheless this principle of relying on our own
capacity should not lead to reluctance to make use of foreign capital, technology
and skill, so long as these are truly devoted to serving the economic interests of the
people without causing dependence on foreign countries.
FIL of 1967, supra note 19, pmbl. (emphasis added).
83. See FIL of 1967, supra note 19, arts. 4, 5; id. art. 8 (establishing the CoW system
for foreign mining); id. art. 18 (granting GOI authority to set duration of license); id. art. 26
(requiring that foreign enterprises "manage and control their enterprises in accordance with
the principles of good business without harming the interests of the state."); see also id arts.
12, 18, 26, 30 (specific requirements regarding such things as manpower and participation of
local capital); M. Sornarajah, ICSID Involvement in Asian Foreign Investment Disputes, 4
ASIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 79-80 (1995) [hereinafter Sornarajah, ICSID] (specifically discussing
the public law function and conditionality of Indonesian regulation of investment admission).
See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 311.
84. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 83-86.
85. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 83-85.
86. Id. at 299.
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environmental conduct, the GOI would still maintain this authority and
the mining companies' rights would still have been subject to it. 7 Noth-
ing in the CoWs changes that situation; rather they explicitly maintain it.88
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
As the foregoing discussion demonstrated, under their respective
CoWs, the mining companies did not have any rights that were violated
by the change in forestry law and thus it would seem no basis for their
threat of arbitration against the GOI. Under Indonesian contract law,
which governs CoWs, this is certainly the case. 9 On the basis of provi-
sions contained in the UK-Indo BIT, the Aus-Indo BIT, and the ASEAN
MIT, it is as well. The following Sections will attempt to show this,
demonstrating not only how the GOI could have beaten any claim by the
mining companies on the merits, but also how it could have sought to
disqualify some or all of the six claims at a preliminary/ jurisdictional
phase. Prior to this discussion, however, the Note will examine the "ob-
ject and purpose" of the three treaties in order to place the subsequent
discussions of each instrument's provisions, the occasional vague word-
ing of which may sometimes suggest a more teleological approach.9°
A. Controlling Purpose
It is common for NAFTA Chapter 1 1 tribunals to begin their analy-
sis with a citation to NAFTA article 102, which directs parties to
interpret and apply NAFTA's provisions in light of its objectives, in-
cluding, inter alia, "increas[ing] substantially investment opportunities
87. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the specific provisions
through which the GOI retained this right).
88. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14, arts.
22-23.
89. See Hoed, supra note 14, at 120; see also Inco CoW, supra note 14, art. 27.
90. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 99 (discussing the intentionally vague
wording of BIT expropriation clauses); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980), art. 31(1) [hereinafter VCLT]. The VCLT is gener-
ally considered to embody customary international law rules of treaty interpretation. See, e.g.,
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS/SB/R, WT/DS1 I/AB/R, at
10-11 (adopted Nov. 1, 1996). Thus, while not all the parties to the instant three instruments
are party to the VCLT, it forms an authoritative source of interpretive guidelines for any tribu-
nal constituted to adjudicate a dispute based on these instruments. See Washington Convention
(ICSID), supra note 40, art. 42(1) (requiring ICSID tribunals to apply international law where
applicable to decide disputes before them).
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in the territories of the parties."9 These tribunals self-consciously do so
in order to follow the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) article 31 directions to interpret a treaty's terms in "their con-
text and in light of its object and purpose" as well as specific
provisions of NAFTA article 102 directing them to do So. These deci-
sions play an important part in the subsequent discussions of
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment guarantees contained in
the instant three treaties. While, as will be demonstrated below, the
mining companies' claims would fail even under the rules articulated in
this context, it is important to distinguish the foregoing object and pur-
pose ascribed by tribunals to NAFTA Chapter 11 from the object and
purpose of the instant three treaties. It will be shown that in contrast
to NAFTA Chapter 11, the instant three instruments embody an object
and purpose beyond simply encouraging and protecting foreign in-
vestment for its own sake. Rather, the object and purpose of the instant
three instruments is to encourage and protect foreign investment so as
to increase each country's prosperity. In the case of Indonesia, this in-
volves a strong retention of control over the admission and conduct of
foreign investment once within its territory.94
Unlike the NAFTA, none of the three instruments contain provi-
sions explicitly directing interpreters to certain objects and purposes.95
It is, therefore, appropriate to determine the object and purpose of each
instrument through an independent examination of the each instru-
ment's respective terms.96 Dolzer and Stevens suggest focusing on the
91. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 102; see, e.g., S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note
28, paras. 197-98; Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 70; Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction,
supra note 28, para. 56.
92. VCLT, supra note 90, art. 31(1); NAFrA, supra note 28, art. 102; see, e.g., S.D.
Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, paras. 201-02; Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para.
70; Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28, para. 56.
93. Whether or not the emphasis on this provision is well placed is certainly subject to
debate. Other provisions in the preamble to the NAFrA, for example, speak of encouragement
of workers' rights and environmental protection. NAFTA, supra note 28, pmbl. See also infra
Part IV, for a discussion of the decisions by NAFA Chapter I I tribunals.
94. See Sornarajah, ICSID, supra note 83, at 79 (discussing the object and purpose of
the FIL of 1967: "It acts in the public interest to ensure that foreign investment is attracted to
Indonesia but that the foreign investment so attracted is of the right variety and would mesh
with the development goals of the Indonesian state.").
95. See NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 102. But see Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25; ASEAN
MIT, supra note 9; UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26.
96. See VCLT, supra note 90, art. 31. Article 31 provides: "1. A treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purposes of the in-
terpretation shall comprise ... the text, including its preamble and annexes ...." Id. art. 31.
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terms of a BIT's preamble to fulfill this inquiry.97 However, the stan-
dardization of many of the terms of these instruments, including the
terms of their preambles, suggests a more nuanced interpretation, one
which examines the text as a whole, paying particular attention to the
terms which vary from standard formulations.98 It is not suggested that
these boilerplate recitations do nothing to elucidate the object and pur-
pose of the treaties. However, as Sornarajah points out, such
standardized prefatory statements may fail to capture the true nature of
the deal they preface, and possibly may even obscure it.99 Unique
terms, on the other hand, show a particular, shared object and purpose
powerful enough to cause unprecedented derivation. Therefore, prior to
analyzing each treaty's respective preambles, the Note will examine the
unique provisions by which each treaty limits the scope of their respec-
tive provisions.
97. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 20.
98. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POL-
ICY AND PRACTICE 32 (1992) (discussing the strict standardization of terms with which more
wealthy countries demanded negotiation of BITs with their less wealthy trading partners).
Compare UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, pmbl., with Great Britain-Model Agreement, pmbl.,
available in DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 228. Excluding the addition of the "Re-
public of Indonesia" in the former, the terms are exactly the same.
99. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21. Sornarajah suggests that the deal they obscure is of
essence an inequitable sacrifice of sovereignty by the less wealthy State party to the agreement
who will generally occupy the position of capital importer. Id. He further points out the
asymmetry of the circumstances that often accompanied the conclusion of BITs, mentioning
even instances where "bilateral investment treaties are secured by ... threats of trade sanc-
tions." Id. at 238; see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 98, at 32-33 (describing the differences
in intended purposes between the U.S. and its less wealthy treaty partners, the former dis-
avowing any purpose to promote investment which the latter usually saw as the chief reason
for concluding them.) It is interesting to note that Indonesia does not have a BIT with the
United States. See http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/indonesia.htm (last visited June 9,
2003) (listing Indonesia's bilateral treaties). For an interesting analysis of why developing
countries may have agreed to inequitable agreements see Andrew Guzman, Explaining The
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 639 (1997), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-12.html
(describing the process in terms of what is known in economic literature as a "prisoner's di-
lemma"). But see, e.g., Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An
Examination of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1, 3 (1983) (suggesting somewhat paradoxically, that poorer countries con-
clude BITs containing provisions at odds with their multilateral declarations in support of the
New International Economic Order in order to assist developed countries in creating stronger
international law protections of foreign investment which the New International Economic
Order threatened).
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1. Scope of the Agreements
In contrast to most or all U.S. BITs and the NAFTA Chapter 11,'00
the instant three treaties do not provide investors national treatment
regarding the establishment of investments. 0' Rather, provisions in all
three explicitly maintain the authority of the Indonesian government to
grant, deny, and/or condition the entrance of foreign investments and
limit the scope of their respective protections to investments so admit-
ted. 
02
In the case of the Aus-Indo BIT and UK-Indo BIT, this is done by
specifically limiting the scope of the respective protections to invest-
ments that "have been granted admission in accordance with the
Foreign Capital Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or any law amending or
replacing it.''° The Aus-Indo BIT goes one step further, actually limit-
ing the definition of covered investments to those which are "admitted
... in conformity with the laws, regulations and investment policies of
the [host-State] applicable from time to time."' As U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted, speaking specifically
about these provisions of the Aus-Indo BIT, "[t]his formula ensures
that full play is given to the regulatory laws of a host-state despite the
treaty so that only foreign investment which conforms with legislation
is entitled to protection."'0 5
The significance of these limitations of scope is increased when
viewed in light of the respective BIT practices of the U.K. and Austra-
lia. While virtually all of the provisions contained within the Aus-Indo
BIT and UK-Indo BIT are exactly the same as, or contain only minor
difference from, other BITs concluded by each respectively, the scope
provisions differ significantly.' 6 Most other BITs concluded by the UK
100. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 98, at 71-72; see also NAFrA, supra note 28, art.
1102; United States-Model Agreement, art. 11(1), supra note 38, at 240.
101. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9; UK-Indo BIT, supra note
26.
102. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. II(1);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
103. The specific formulation quoted is from the UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
However the language of the Aus-Indo BIT is almost exactly the same. Aus-Indo BIT, supra
note 25, art. III(l)(a) (limiting protection to investments "which have been granted admission
in accordance with the Law No. I of 1967 concerning Foreign Investment or with any law
amending or replacing it").
104. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. l(l)(a).
105. UNCTAD, supra note 36, at 36; see also Sornarajah, ICSID, supra note 83, at 79.
106. See, e.g., Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25; UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26; Great Brit-
ain-Model Agreement, supra note 39; Australia and Philippines Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 5, 1996, 1945 U.N.T.S. 143; Aus-
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or Australia not only lack a clause as particular as that contained in
their respective agreements with Indonesia, but in fact do not limit the
scope of their protections at all beyond a broad definition of investment
which is common to most BITs. °7 It thus seems likely that the inclusion
of these provisions was a condition of Indonesia's consent. They also
seem to embody the parties' purpose to craft a deal which, while pro-
tecting and encouraging investment, would do so in a manner that
allowed Indonesia to tightly control the establishment and conduct of
foreign investment to ensure that admitted investment furthered rather
than frustrated its greater goals, such as the maintenance of a healthy
environment for its people.' °8 Various provisions in each treaty which
make clear that the operation of investments once established would be
regulated by Indonesian law further this conclusion.' 9
The ASEAN MIT goes even further. Article 11(1) requires specific
approval in writing by the host-State of individual investments in order
for it to be covered by the treaty's provisions."0 To quote UNCTAD
again, "[t]his formula ensures that a State decides on an ad hoc basis
whether foreign investment is so desirable that it be given treaty pro-
tection.""' Treaty protection is thereby made expressly conditional and
thus instrumental. Even if Indonesia granted the investment in question
admission under the FIL of 1967, it could use the possibility of protec-
tion under the ASEAN MIT as a bargaining chip with foreign investors
to extract additional concessions from them. The text of the treaty, in
tralia and Viet Nam Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Mar. 5, 1991, 1661 U.N.T.S. 226; Australia and Romania Agreement on the Reciprocal Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, June 21, 1993, 1819 U.N.T.S. 413; Australia and China
Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept. 26, 1988,
1514 U.N.T.S. 81.
107. See references cited supra note 106.
108. See Somarajah, ICSID, supra note 83, at 79-80.
109. See, e.g., Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 11(3) ("A party shall, subject to its laws,
accord within its territory protection and security to investments") (emphasis added); id. art. X
("Each party shall, with a view to promoting the understanding of its laws that pertain to or
affect investments in its territory by investors of the other Party, make such laws public and
readily accessible."). As Robert Thompson, former Secretary General of the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, observed, article X "shows that those who
drafted the Treaty had already thought that subsequent laws might at any time incidentally
affect in many ways the actual operation of investment activity by the investors." E-mail from
Robert Thompson, Former Secretary General of International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration, to Stuart Gross (July 30, 2002, 11:43 AM EST) (on file with author). There would
be no need to include a guarantee of transparency of host country laws that affect investment if
the parties to the treaty did not intend to guarantee the host country's authority to enact such
laws. Id.
110. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art 11(1).
111. UNCTAD, supra note 36, at 36.
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fact, makes this explicit, allowing the host-State the authority to grant
or deny an investment protection "upon such conditions as it deems fit
for the purposes of this Agreement.""' 2 As this formula and other provi-
sions suggest, the "purpose of this agreement" was to enable host
countries to retain control over foreign investment, encouraging only
investment which fulfilled its specific goals of increased prosperity and
development, and controlling its conduct to make sure it does so."13 As
in the case of the Aus-Indo BIT and the UK-Indo BIT this conclusion
is reinforced by provisions elsewhere in the agreements which state
that all admitted investments "shall ... be governed by the laws and
regulations of the host country."' 14
2. The Preambles
The respective preambles of the three instruments differ from
one another to greater and lesser extents, but have in common an
overriding instrumental approach to the promotion and protection of
investment."5 Each lists investment promotion and protection of in-
vestment as underlying principles, but in wording that expressly
confirms the instrumental role of these "principles" in the pursuit of
larger "objectives," including the increased "prosperity" of the respec-
tive parties. ' 6 The Supreme Court of British Colombia, in a review of a
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal decision, recently emphasized the impor-
tance of this distinction."' The Court annulled a portion of the
tribunal's holding which was based on a misinterpretation of the "prin-
ciple" of transparency in NAFTA as rather an "object" of NAFTA in
and of itself."8 The court made clear that as a principle, transparency
112. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 11(1).
113. Id. art. II(l); see also id. pmbl.
114. Id. art. III(l).
115. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, pmbl.; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, pmbl.; UK-Indo
BIT, supra note 26, pmbl.
116. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, pmbl. (recognizing that "pursuit of these objectives
[which include 'fostering of prosperity in both countries'] would be facilitated by a clear
statement of principles and measures relating to the promotion and protection of invest-
ments...") (emphasis added); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, pmbl. ("Recognizing that an
agreement on the promotion and protection of such investment will contribute to the further-
ance of the above mentioned purposes" which include "to increase prosperity in their
respective territories") (emphasis added); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, pmbl. ("Recognising
that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international agreement of such in-
vestments ... will increase prosperity in both states") (emphasis added).





was only a means by which the parties were to seek the achievement of
actual objectives and so could not be employed by tribunals" seeking to
interpret the agreement's object and purpose."'
Similarly, it would be a mischaracterization to state that the object
and purpose of the instant three treaties is to promote and protect in-
vestment. Their purpose rather is to increase the mutual prosperity of
the parties, and investment protection and encouragement is a principle
meant to achieve this goal.' 20 The Aus-Indo BIT and UK-Indo BIT
phrase these objectives in only very general terms.' 2' The ASEAN
MIT's preamble, on the other hand, goes into greater detail, emphasiz-
ing not only the increased flow of financial capital, but also intellectual
capital between the countries and the greater goal of increasing indus-
trialization in the countries party to the instrument.1
22
Neither the UK-Indo BIT preamble nor the ASEAN MIT preamble
contain much beyond this articulation of the principle of investment
protection and promotion in order to achieve the goal of greater mutual
prosperity.' 23 The preamble of the Aus-Indo BIT, however, contains two
additional provisions which reinforce its object to retain host-State au-
thority over the establishment and control of foreign investment.' 24 It
states that the creation of "favorable conditions for investments by the
investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party" is to be ac-
complished "on the basis of sovereign equality," further acknowledging
that investments "would be made within the framework of the laws of
the [host-State].' 2' Both of these statements strongly evince an object
and purpose to maintain the sovereign control of host-States over the
establishment and conduct of foreign investment so as to assure their
compatibility with its goals of increased prosperity.'2 6 This underlying
object and purpose underlies all three treaties and should therefore in-
form any interpretation of their respective terms.
127
119. Id.
120. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 238 (raising the possibility that on the basis of
such provisions, only investments which actually increased the prosperity or "economic de-
velopment of the capital-receiving state" should be eligible for protection).
121. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, pmbl.; UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, pmbl.
122. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, pmbl.
123. See id.; UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, pmbl.
124. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, pmbl.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. VCLT, supra note 90, art. 31 (1).
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III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES-RATIONE MATERIAE.
AND RATIONE PERSONAE
12 8
The jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal to hear a claim by an investor
under any of the three instruments (and thus the mining companies'
rights to bring that claim) is conditioned on the consent of both parties
and the fulfillment of two categories of fundamental requirements, ra-
tione personae and ratione materiae. 2 9 The provisions of the Washington
128. The following Part will draw distinctions between the respective procedural rights
that investors have under each of the three instruments, demonstrating the additional difficul-
ties investors might face depending on which instrument was utilized to invoke arbitration. It
might be argued that these distinctions are irrelevant in light of the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) clauses contained in each treaty, which an investor might attempt to invoke as a basis
for claiming rights to the more favorable procedural treatment contained in another BIT. See
Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. IV; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IV(2); UK-Indo BIT,
supra note 26, art. 4. A recent ICSID tribunal has, in fact, held that an MFN clause contained
in the BIT at issue granted the investor the right to the greater procedural rights contained in
another BIT concluded by the host country. Maffenzini Award, supra note 43. However, the
MFN clause at issue in Maffenzini referred to "all matters subject to this Agreement." Id. para.
50. The tribunal distinguished this formulation from those in the other BITs concluded by
Spain, which, like the MFN clauses of each of the instant three instruments, refer to MFN in
the treatment of investors and investments. Id.; see Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. IV;
ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IV(2); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 4. Such clauses, ac-
cording to the Maffenzini tribunal, manifested "of course a narrower formulation." Maffenzini
Award, supra note 43, para. 50. The plain meaning of these terms read in light of the instru-
ments' object and purpose, described supra Part II, to encourage and protect certain types of
investment, while maintaining tight government control over the types of investments and
investors which are admitted, militates toward a "narrower formulation." Id. Thus they guaran-
tee MFN treatment only in regard to the substantive treatment of investments and investors,
not the procedural rights which determine the manner in which those rights are invoked. The
Maffenzini tribunal, in fact, intimated as much, holding that, even in the context of a broadly
formulated clause like the one before it, certain public policy grounds would restrict the free-
dom of the tribunal to extend MFN to procedural rights, particularly if it appeared that the
provisions that would thereby be substituted were fundamental to the consent of the State
against whom its replacement would be enforced. Id. at 52. In the instant situation the provi-
sions which would most likely be affected relate to the determination of whether or not
Indonesia has preemptively consented to arbitration through the provisions in the agreement,
see infra notes 210-30, and the definition of an investor covered by the agreement, see infra
notes 139-52 and accompanying text. Both sets of provisions go to the heart of the extent of
the obligations for which Indonesia has bargained, while the second additionally implicates
the instruments' object and purpose of controlled investment admission and protection. See
supra Part II. Thus, both were undoubtedly material to Indonesia's respective decisions to
consent to the agreements, and so under even a broad formulation should not be subject to
MFN treatment.
129. See CHRISTOPHER H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, at 89,
para. 3 (2001); see also Washington Convention (ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25(1) ("The
Jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an invest-
ment, between a Contracting State ... and a national of another Contracting State, which the
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre."); Goetz v. Rep. of Burundi,
Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ARB/95/3 (Feb. 10, 1999), reported in 26
Y.B. COM. ARB. 24, para. 30 (2001) [hereinafter Goetz Award] (quoting Executive Directors of
[Vol. 24:893
Inordinate Chill
Convention (ICSID) in combination with the specific terms of the appli-
cable instrument determine the constitution of these requirements.
Ratione personae is roughly equivalent to personal jurisdiction, and re-
quires that the State party be an ICSID Contracting Party and that the
investor qualify as a "national" of a non-host-State ICSID Contracting
Party.3 ' Ratione materiae refers basically to the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the tribunal and can be broken down into two categories:
qualification of the investment to which the claim relates and qualifica-
tion of the dispute on which the claim is based.' The final and
fundamental condition is that parties have consented to arbitration.'33 If
any of these conditions are unmet, the jurisdiction of the tribunal will be
inadequate and the complaint dismissed.' 3
I In terms of the mining companies' claims, ratione personae would
hot be an issue regarding Indonesia, because it is an ICSID Contracting
Party. 33 However, with regard to investor qualification, issues of ratione
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, para. 23, Doc. ICSID/2). Paragraph 23 provides:
The consent of both parties is an essential condition for the jurisdiction of the Cen-
tre, but it is insufficient on its own to place a dispute under the jurisdiction of the
Centre. In conformity with the aims of the [Washington] Convention [(ICSID)], the
jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited by the nature of the dispute and the par-
ties.
Id.; Mihaly Award, supra note 43, para. 14 (parsing the first clause of article 25(1) into, "(i)
that there was a dispute; (ii) that the dispute was a legal one; (iii) that the dispute arises di-
rectly and not indirectly out of an investment; and (iv) that there was an investment out of
which a legal dispute has directly arisen."). Note that both the Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25,
art. XI(2)(a), and the ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2), provide for options of dispute
settlement in addition to ICSID arbitration. In the case of the Aus-Indo BIT, this consists of a
right to submit to the host-State's judicial system, Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(2)(a),
while the ASEAN MIT provides for a range of alternative arbitration mechanisms. ASEAN
MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2). As a thorough survey of all the eventualities which could result
in this context is beyond the scope of this Note, I will not address them except where it is
necessary for the arguments raised.
130. See Washington Convention (ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25(1); Aus-Indo BIT,
supra note 25, arts. I(l)(a), III(l)(a), III, XI(l)-(2); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, arts. 1(3), II,
X(1)-(2); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, arts. 1(a), 2, 7(1).
131. SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 89, para. 3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Goetz Award, supra note 129, para. 30; Mihaly Award, supra note 43, para. 13.
Note, however, that under limited circumstances parties and or claims which do not meet these
requirements (except of course the consent requirement) can bring a claim under what is
known as the "Additional Facility" of ICSID. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 92-94, paras.
10-14. Because neither Mexico nor Canada are parties to the Washington Convention
(ICSID), it is under the Additional Facility that NAFTA Chapter 11 claims are brought. See
ICSID website, at http://www.worldbank.org/ICSID/constate/constate.htm, for a list of con-
tracting parties.
135. See ICSID website, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid (last visited June 9, 2003).
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personae could be dispositive in two of the six investors' claims. Regard-
ing ratione materiae, a similarly mixed bag exists. The investment
qualification leg provides a potential basis for dismissal of all six claims;
the other leg, qualification of the dispute, likely would not be an issue.
Finally, in light of the respective wording of the three instruments, Indo-
nesia's consent would only be an issue regarding the UK-Indo BIT, but
in cases brought under it the issue would,be dispositive' 36
A. Ratione Personae
1. Investor Qualification
All three treaties make the provision of their respective protections
and the procedural mechanisms for their enforcement available only to
qualified investors of the other State parties.'37 However, significant dif-
ferences in the manner in which each instrument defines qualified
juridical persons has important implications for which of the mining




The UK-Indo BIT defines juridical persons in accordance with tradi-
tional rules of customary international law, looking only to the place of a
company's legal incorporation or constitution for definition of its nation-
ality.'39 Thus, in our situation Rio Tinto plc, the British incorporated
136. See UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
137. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. II; UK-
Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2.
138. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(b)(ii)(B), ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
1(l)-(2); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(c)-(d). Of the six companies, one-Banpu, major-
ity owner of PT Jorong Barutama-directly qualifies as an investor under the ASEAN MIT.
See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(2). Three companies-Newcrest, majority owner of PT
Nusa Halmahera, BHP Billiton, majority owner of PT Gag Nikle, and Laverton Gold NL,
majority owner of PT Jorong Barutama-directly qualify under the Aus-Indo BIT. See Aus-
Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(l)(b)(ii). One company, Rio Tinto plc indirectly the 40 percent
owner of PT Galuh Cempaka, qualifies under the UK-Indo BIT. See UK-Indo BIT, supra note
26, art. l(d)(i). However, due to other jurisdictional/preliminary issues Rio Tinto plc likely
would not be able to claim the UK-Indo BIT's protections for the investment in question. See
infra notes 193-94, 228-30 and accompanying text. Two companies-Rio Tinto LTD, forty
percent owner of PT Galuh Cempaka and the wholly owned Australian subsidiary of British
Rio Tinto plc, and Weda Bay Pty LTD, majority owner of PT Weda Bay Nikel and the wholly
owned Australian subsidiary of Canadian Weda Bay Minerals-provisionally qualify as inves-
tors under the Aus-Indo BIT. Such protection is subject to GOI and the Australian government
consultation "with a view to deciding not to extend the rights and benefits of this Agreement
to such investor." See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 1(1)(b)(ii)(B), 111(3); see also infra
notes 148-52 (discussing this provision and its potential effect on the latter two investors'
claims).
139. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(d); see SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 246.
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parent company of the Australian company Rio Tinto LTD (40 percent
owner PT Galuh Cempaka) qualifies as an investor under the UK-Indo
BIT.140
b. ASEAN MIT
The ASEAN MIT, on the other hand, requires both legal incorpora-
tion in a State party to the convention and that the place of incorporation
be "wherein... effective management is located."' 4' Thus, only Banpu, a
company incorporated and headquartered in Thailand, qualifies under
the ASEAN MIT.' None of the other six companies, even if they estab-
lished a subsidiary in an ASEAN State, would qualify unless they also
transferred effective management of the operations of the subsidiary to
the State of incorporation as well. This more restrictive formulation was
likely chosen to protect ASEAN MIT State parties from claims by inves-
tors attempting to qualify for protection by merely establishing a shell
corporation in a signatory State. A technique Robert Thompson
accurately described as the "corporate equivalent of 'flags of conven-
ience.' ,141
140. Note, however, significant obstacles exist regarding any claim by Rio Tinto plc,
both with regard to investment qualification, and the GOI's consent. See infra Sections III.B.1,
III.C.
141. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(2).
142. See id.
143. E-mail from Robert Thompson, Former Secretary General of International Chamber
of Commerce Court of Arbitration, to Stuart Gross (July 17, 2002, 5:27 A.M. EST) (on file
with author). An informative example of this sort of strategy is provided by current efforts by
Bechtel to hold the Bolivian government liable for losses sustained when a week of pitched
street battles brought on by the company's decision to raise municipal water prices forced the
company to withdraw from a concession contract to run the municipal water system of
Cochabamba, Bolivia. Bechtel is a major infrastructure company incorporated in the United
States, headquartered in San Francisco with operations all over the world. The United States
does not have a BIT with Bolivia. The operations in Chobamba were not, however, directly
controlled by Bechtel but rather were operated by a company named Aguas del Tunari, which
at the time of the contract was incorporated in the Cayman Islands and was 55 percent owned
by a wholly owned subsidiary of Bechtel. However, one month later Bechtel sold half of its
share to another party, and Aguas del Tunari changed its place of incorporation to Holland,
becoming part of a Dutch shell company named International Water Holding B.V. The extent
of the company's presence in Holland is a postbox. As a result of the many maneuvers and the
wording of the Bolivian-Dutch BIT (which is similar to that of the UK-Indo BIT article
I (d)(i)), Bechtel, which is now a minority but still controlling shareholder in the concern, is
able to employ in its claim against the government of Bolivia a BIT concluded between Bo-
livia and the Netherlands even though its connections to the Netherlands are purely pro forma.
See Bechtel vs. Bolivia: Bechtel's Legal Action Against Bolivia, PAC. NEWS SERV., Dec. 19,
2001, available at http://www.democracyctr.org/bechteUindex.htm (last'visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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c. Aus-Indo BIT
The Aus-Indo BIT takes a mixed and rather complicated approach.
Qualified Australian juridical persons are defined both in terms of place
of incorporation as well as in terms of ownership and control, with (pos-
sibly impotent) qualifications placed on the former.'" Under article
I(1)(b)(ii)(B)(ii), if a juridical person is owned and controlled by an Aus-
tralian individual or another Australian juridical person, it qualifies as an
Australian investor, irrespective of the laws under which it is incorpo-
rated. ' 5 Under article I(1)(b)(ii)(B)(i), a juridical person can qualify
solely on the basis of incorporation under the laws of Australia; however,
this is qualified by article 111(3) which states that when a juridical person
incorporated in Australia "is owned or controlled by a citizen or entity of
any third country the parties may consult with a view to deciding not to
extend the rights and benefits of this Agreement to such investor."' 46
The effect of this very unusual wording is difficult to determine ex-
actly. While the phrase "with a view to deciding not to extend" seems to
create a presumption against the extension, it is arguable that in the ab-
sence of any decision by the parties to the contrary, the investor would
remain provisionally qualified.' 47 This may be the result of sloppy (or
clever) drafting, but it seems to allow Australia to stonewall any attempt
by Indonesia to deny protection to non-Australian investors employing
Australian "flags of convenience."'4 '8 This could have immediate implica-
tions for the current situation.
Newcrest of Australia, BHP Billiton of Australia, and Laverton Gold
NL of Australia all easily qualify under either formulation as they are all
incorporated in Australia and are owned and controlled by Australians.'49
However, Weda Bay Minerals Pty. Ltd. and Rio Tinto LTD are both
wholly owned Australian subsidiaries of non-Australian companies, re-
spectively the Canadian firm Weda Bay Minerals and the British firm
Rio Tinto plc. Canada does not have an investment agreement with In-
donesia and the UK-Indo BIT, as will be discussed below, likely does not
provide its investors with an automatic right to arbitration.'5 ° Thus, a
"decision not to extend the rights and benefits" of the Aus-Indo BIT by
144. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 1(1)(b)(ii)(B).
145. ld. art. I(l)(b)(ii)(B)(ii).
146. Id. art. 111(3).
147. See id.
148. E-mail from Robert Thompson, supra note 143.
149. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(l)(b)(ii)(B).
150. For a list of States with whom Indonesia has concluded BITs, see the ICSID web-
site, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/indonesia.htm. See infra notes 228-30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Indonesia's manifestation of consent (or lack thereof)
to arbitrate in the UK-Indo BIT.
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the GOI and Australia would effectively preclude both of their claims. 5'
While, on the other hand, a refusal by Australia to agree to such a deci-
sion might allow both parties to invoke the protections of a treaty from
which they were arguably not meant to benefit.'
5 2
B. Ratione Materiae
Even assuming that the mining companies qualified as investors they
would still need to meet the criteria for ratione materiae. In other words,
they must show that the investment on which the claim is based qualifies
for protection and that there exists a legal dispute between the investor
and the GOI which is related to that investment.'53
1. Investment Qualification
Qualification of the mining companies' investments depends on two
things. First, it must qualify as an "investment" under the respective
definitions laid out in the three treaties.' Second, it must be in confor-
mity with the conditions for protection each treaty lays out, namely
compliance with the FIL of 1967.' The first condition is unmet if the
CoWs, the basis of the mining companies' claims, are shown to be void
as a matter of law.56 The second condition is unmet if it can be shown
that the investment was not admitted or conducted in compliance with
the FIL of 1967.' 27 It is potentially arguable that none of the companies
meet either of these criteria.
a. Provisional Qualification
The Washington Convention (ICSID) leaves the definition of a cov-
ered investment to the discretion of the parties.' Thus, qualification of
an investment under all three instruments depends upon their respective
definitions of investment, which in language common to most HAs,
151. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 111(3).
152. See id. art. I(1)(b)(ii)(B)(i).
153. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 89, para. 3.
154. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, arts. I(1)(a), III(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9,
arts. 1(3), (II)(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, arts. 1(a), 2(1).
155. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, pmbl., art. 11I(1)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9,
arts. (H)(1), HI(I); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
156. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(1)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(3);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 1(a).
157. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(1)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
II(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
158. SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 124, para. 88; see also Washington Convention
(ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25(1) (leaving the definition of "investment" undefined).
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define investment "as broadly as possible."'59 The definitions include
"business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including
concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural re-
sources" '160 and shares, stocks, or debentures in a qualified investment.
6
The Aus-Indo BIT definition of investment goes one step further and
includes "activities associated with investments.' 62 Thus, it seems clear
that mining companies' respective CoWs would provisionally qualify as
investments under whichever of the three instruments is applicable. Pro-
visional qualification is, however, just that-provisional.
159. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 240; For the instrument's respective definition of
investment see Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(1)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(3);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. I (a).
160. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(a)(v); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(3)(e);
Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(l)(a)(v). According to Sornarajah, in the case of most BITs
and MITs, these sorts of provisions have the effect of transforming what is essentially a li-
cense to explore for natural resources into a property right, highly restricting the host-State's
authority to cancel such licenses. He therefore questions whether developing States could fully
have contemplated at the time of conclusion the freezing of their formerly discretionary pow-
ers that these instruments effect and still have agreed to them. Such provisions, he states, are
contrary to the notion of permanent national sovereignty over natural resources, "which some
authorities regard asjus cogens," in which case such an agreement would be held to be void as
a matter of international law. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 242-43. However, as is dis-
cussed below, the explicit requirements in all three instruments that the investment be made in
compliance with the FIL of 1967 and other laws which govern its operation do not effect a
similar indefeasible transformation, but work to retain the "licensed" character of these rights.
161. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(a)(ii); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. 1(3)(b);
Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. l(l)(a)(ii). It is important to note that tribunals have now, at
least twice, held that such wording allows even minority shareholders to claim damages in
proportion to their ownership for actions of host-States in violation of treaty provisions. See
Lanco Int'l Inc. v. Arg. Rep., Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, Int'l Centre for Settlement
of Inv. Disputes, ARB/97/6 (Dec. 8, 1998), reported in 40 I.L.M. 457, 461, para. 10 (2001)
(holding that the "definition of [an investment in the applicable BIT] is very broad and allows
for many meanings,' including an 18.3 percent share of "capital stock of the Grantee"); AAPL
v. Sri Lanka, Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ARB/87/3 (June, 17 1990),
reported in 17 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 106 (1992). According to Somarajah, this represents a signifi-
cant departure from traditional customary international law whereby a State's protection of
corporate entities was strictly limited to those entities incorporated in that State. SORNARAJAH,
supra note 21, at 246
162. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(l)(a)(vi). While this may reflect a broader defi-
nition of property rights that can be infringed upon and thus a larger scope for damages under
this instrument than the others, it is clear that if the underlying investment with which the
activities are associated itself does not qualify for protection, neither do the activities associ-
ated with it. The NAFTA Chapter II tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada gave substance
to one interpretation of this type of provision, holding that the claimants' ability to sell lumber
was an "investment" protected under NAFTA Chapter 11 because it was a very important part
of the business of the claimant and this affected his investment, "the true interests at stake
[being] the Investment's asset base." See Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para.
98. It follows that in order for the business activity to be covered under this provision it must





Irrespective of the provisional qualification of the mining compa-
nies' investments under the treaties' investment definition, if the CoWs
are shown to be void as a matter of law, "there is by definition no con-
tract to be expropriated" or denied fair and equitable treatment, and so
• , ' • • • 163
no basis for a tribunal's jurisdiction. The bases for any finding that the
rights are void arise out of the CoWs' contractual quality. Though C6Ws
are in important ways licenses, they are also fundamentally contracts
between the GOI as the sole owner of the minerals and the foreign com-
pany or joint venture that extracts the minerals as a contractor for the
government.' 4 According to the choice of law clauses contained within
each CoW, Indonesian law governs interpretation of their validity and
performance. 165 Indonesian contract law is based on the Old Dutch Civil
Code and remains essentially unchanged. The conditions for validity,
embodied in the Third Book of the Indonesian Civil Code (KUHPPer-
data), are consent of the parties, capacity of the parties, a certain subject,
and a lawful purpose.' 6 An unlawful purpose is defined broadly to in-
clude causes which are unlawful as well as contrary to good morals and
public policy; a contract found to involve such a cause is void as matter
of law.'
16
Various international commercial arbitration tribunals have ad-
dressed the issue of contracts with unlawful causes, or "illegality," in
recent years, particularly with regard to contracts which purported to
create obligations in one of the parties to bribe government officials.
68
The bulk of these cases have dealt mainly with conflict of laws issues
which are not applicable here. However, they also all stand for the
163. Azinian v. Mexico (DESONA), Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes
(Add'l Facility), ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), reported in 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 262, para. 273
(2000). Note the argument in this context gets very close to discussion of the merits and could
be raised at that point. It is dealt with here partly for the sake of convenient organization and
partly because success on this issue at a jurisdictional phase would eliminate the need to get to
the merits.
164. See Hoed, supra note 14, at 120; see also Inco Cow, supra note 14, art. 27.
165. Hoed, supra note 14, at 20.
166. Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata Buku Ketiga Tentang Perikatan, art. 1320
[hereinafter KUHPPerdata], available at http://www.asiamaya.com/undang-undang/
perdata/home3.htm (unofficial) (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
167. Id. arts. 1335-37; see also, R. SUBEKTI, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS IN INDONESIA 5
(1989) (Subekti is a former Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court).
168. See, e.g., Himpurna Cal. Energy Ltd. v. PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara, Ad Hoc
Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, Jakarta (May 4, 1999), reported in 25 Y.B. COM. ARB.
13, para. 118 (2000) [hereinafter Himpurna Award]; Consultant (State Y) v. State Agency
(State Y), Final Award, Int'l Chamber of Commerce, No. 7047 (1994), reported in 21 Y.B.
INT'L ARB. 79, para. 41 (1996) [hereinafter Consultant (State Y) Award]; Argentine Engineer
v. British Co., Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Award, No. 1110 (1963), reported in 21 Y.B.
INT'L ARB. 47, para. 16 (1996) [hereinafter Argentine Engineer Award].
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proposition that a contract which involves an unlawful cause is void and
thus incapable of protection.' 69 Thus, if evidence was adduced showing
the formation or performance of a CoW involved an unlawful purpose it
would be void and thus cease to be an investment covered by the trea-
ties. 70
i. Corruption in Formation and Performance
Many have alleged that during the Suharto period, when most of the
six companies concluded CoWs and began operations, foreign mining
projects in Indonesia involved high levels of official corruption.'7 ' Cor-
ruption, as professor Gary Bell, an expert on Indonesian contract law,
states, "[c]ertainly ... is against public order."'72 It was also against the
law at the time of the CoWs' formations and performances.'73 Thus, if it
could be shown that the formation or performance of any of the six
CoWs involved corruption, the CoWs would be void and their rights ex-
tinguished and incapable of protection.7 4 An ad hoc tribunal organized
under United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) rules to hear a claim against an organ of the Indonesian
government recently intimated as much, stating that "[a]rbitrators ...
169. Himpurna Award, supra note 168, para. 116; Consultant (State Y) Award, supra
note 168, para. 41; Argentine Engineer Award, supra note 168, para. 16. The choice-of-law
issues are not applicable here because the CoWs' choice-of-law clause designates Indonesian
law to govern performance and validity of the contract creating no possible conflicts with the
law of place of performance, which is also Indonesia. See supra note 166 and accompanying
text.
170. See SUBEKTI, supra note 167, at 5; Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. I(l)(a)(v);
ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. l(3)(e); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(a)(v).
171. See, e.g., ICG REPORT, supra note 48, at 1 ("[E]xploitation of resources like timber
and minerals during the rule of President Soeharto was dominated by companies connected to
the regime elite. Though formally legal, this exploitation was often heedless of local commu-
nities and the environment and permeated by official corruption and rule-breaking .... ")
STATE OF THE FOREST, supra note 48, at 23.
172. Gary F. Bell, Professor, Singapore National University, to Stuart Gross (Aug. 20,
2002, 3:46 A.M. EST) (on file with author).
173. Undang-Undang No. 3 Tahun 1971 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi
(Law No. 3 of 1971 Concerning the Prevention of Criminal Corruption); Undang-Undang No.
28 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Negara Yang Bersih Dan Bebas Dari Korupsi,
Kolusi, Dan Nepotisme (Law No. 28 of 1999 Concerning the Creation of a Nation that is
Clean and Free From Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), available at
http://www.asiamaya.com/undang-undang/uu-penyelenggaraan-negara/uu-penyelenggaraan-
negarajindex.htm (unofficial) (last visited Apr. 8, 2003); Undang-Undang No. 31 Tahun 1999
Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Law No. 31 of 1999 Concerning the Preven-
tion of Criminal Corruption), available at http://www.asiamaya.comundang-undang/
uu-korupsi/uu-korupsi_index.htm (unofficial) (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
174. See SUBEKTI, supra note 167, at 5; see also Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art.
I(l)(a)(v); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. I(3)(e); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. I(a)(v).
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would rigorously oppose any attempt to use the arbitral process to give
effect to contracts contaminated by corruption."'
7 5
ii. Violation of Mandatory Rules of Law--Compensation
to Traditional Rights Holders
The CoWs would also be invalid if they authorized either of the par-
ties to take actions which were in violation of mandatory rules of
Indonesian law. The Indonesian Supreme Court has found in cases in-
volving foreign investment and trade that the laws which govern those
activities are mandatory and any contract whose performance contra-
venes those laws are void.7 This might be particularly relevant in our
case in regard to laws regulating the manner in which mining companies
are required to compensate those whose resource rights holders are nega-
tively affected by the establishment or operation of mining activities.
175. Himpurna Award, supra note 168, para. 118. The tribunal, however, qualified this
statement, stating "such grave accusations must be proven." Id. According to the many rumors
that circulated regarding this case and other similar cases brought by investors against Indone-
sia at around the same time, the counsel for the Indonesian State party was hindered in his
ability to present evidence regarding corruption, because of the continued influence of many
who have been so implicated, including children of the former President Suharto and current
government officials. Thus, while the tribunal was certainly correct that any such accusation
must be proved, one can question its other statements voicing a strong public policy prefer-
ence for sustaining the validity of contracts in these settings, and questioning why the GOI
had neither communicated their claim of invalidity to the other party earlier nor attempted to
cancel the contract rather than simply modify it now through arbitration. Id. paras. 114-116. It
seems clear that whatever general public policy favoring contractual viability has to give way
when there is a strong possibility that contract in question was concluded under corrupt terms.
That possibility certainly does not prove corruption, but it certainly implicates a presumption
that the parties freely and legally entered into a consensual agreement that should be pro-
tected. In this context, public policy militates rather for increased scrutiny. The fact that the
GOI had not previously attempted to cancel the contract and was now seeking only to modify
its terms is clearly explicable by the nature of the transaction at issue, i.e., a power plant con-
struction and operation contract. A country such as Indonesia, with over 80 million people
living on the main island of Java (approximately the size of New York state), a growing energy
thirst and limited foreign reserves, cannot lightly take power plants off the grid. Further, under
the applicable rules of civil contract law, a contract with an unlawful subject, such as one
tainted by corruption, is void not voidable. See SUBEKTI, supra note 167, at 5. Therefore, as a
matter of law, it is of no significance what the GOI did or did not do, the contract is void. See
also Thomas Walde, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment-The Effec-
tiveness of International Law Disciplines Versus Sanction by Global Markets in Reducing the
Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Investment, J. WORLD TRADE (Apr. 2000), at 1, 28
(noting the weakness of any investor's claim, where the subject of the suit was tainted with
corruption).
176. See, e.g., ED and F Man (Sugar) Ltd. v. Yani Haryanto, Supreme Court Reg. No.
1205K/Pdt/1990, summarized in SUDARGO GAUTAMA, INDONESIAN BUSINESS LAW § 3-088
(Jack Teo Cheng Chuah ed., 1997) (finding that a contract which provided for private importa-
tion of sugar was in contradiction with Indonesian law which provided for a state monopoly of
sugar imports, and so was void as a matter of law).
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All mining in Indonesia is governed by the BML, which contains
mandatory terms for all mine operators.'77 The law requires mine opera-
tors to compensate any holder of rights to land which has been
appropriated for the mining activity.'78 It also requires them to compen-
sate any holder of rights to land, whether inside or outside the mining
area, whose rights have been disturbed by the mine operations, whether
or not such damage was foreseeable or intentional.179 Pursuant to article
1 8(B)(2) of the Indonesian Constitution, as well as articles 3 and 5 of the
Basic Agrarian Law, various rights to the land under adat (traditional
law) are recognized.8 However, the World Bank and others have found
that resource extractive industries in Indonesia commonly fail to pay
compensation payments to indigenous and other local communities
whose traditional land rights have been negatively affected or de-
stroyed.'' If it can be proven that any of the six mining companies failed
to pay such compensation and that such a failure was authorized in the
deal embodied in their respective CoWs, that CoW would be void as
matter of Indonesian law, and ineligible for protection under any of the
three instruments. 
82
c. Investment Not Within the Scope of the Treaties
In addition to these general conditions, which are likely applicable in
one form or another to a claim under any IIA, an additional hurdle exists
regarding protection under the instant three treaties. All three instru-
ments require that investments be specifically approved in order to
quality for protection, and do so in a manner that makes continued pro-
tection conditional on compliance with the terms of their approval.'83 If
any of the six investors can be shown to have failed to comply with these
conditions either initially or during the life of their investment, the in-
vestment would not qualify for protection under the respective
instruments.
Both the Aus-Indo BIT and the UK-Indo BIT establish this condi-
tionality by explicitly limiting the scope of their respective treaty
177. BML, supra note 78, art. 15
178. Id. art. 27(l).
179. Id. art. 25(l).
180. INDON. CONST. art. 18(B)(2); Undang-Undang Pokok Agria Tahun 1967 (Basic
Agrarian Law 1967), arts. 3, 5, available at http://www.menlh.go.id/peraturan/uu/uu1 174/
(official) (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
181. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 47, at 24; LYNCH, supra note 60, at xxvii, 31,
89, 65-66, 67-69, 126. ICG REPORT, supra note 48, at 16.
182. See SUBEKTI, supra note 167, at 5; see also Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art.
l(1)(a)(v); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. I(3)(e); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(a)(v).
183. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
11(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(l).
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protections to investments which have been granted admission in accor-
dance with the FIL of 1967 or any law amending or replacing it.' 84 But as
noted above, the FIL of 1967 does not simply govern the admission of
foreign investment but also regulates the conduct of foreign investment
through a system of licensing, which makes continued admission condi-
tional on fulfillment of various requirements. 88 By directly referencing
the FIL of 1967, the Aus-Indo BIT and UK-Indo BIT incorporate the
same conditionality in terms of protection.'8 6 An investment that has
failed to conform to the conditions of the FIL of 1967, either at admis-
sion or during its operation, is not an investment "in accordance with"
the FIL of 1967 and, thus, is outside the scope of either treaty.'
8 7
The ASEAN MIT also requires that all investments for which its
protections are sought comply with the host country's laws regarding its
admission and operation, but adds the additional requirement that the
investment be specifically approved for protection "upon such conditions
as [the host country] deems fit for the purpose of [the] agreement.'""
Thus, a company, such as Banpu of Thailand, which is seeking protec-
tion under the ASEAN MIT has four initial hurdles. In addition to
conforming to the conditions of FRL of 1967 both at its admission and
once established, the investment must have been specifically granted
coverage by the treaty in writing and have complied with the conditions
on which that coverage was based.'89
i. Initial Admission Under the FIL of 1967
For most of the six investments we can assume that they have com-
plied at least initially with the requirement that they were admitted in
accordance with the FIL of 1967.90 In fact, the very existence of the
CoW proves at least initial compliance with the FL of 1967.'"' However,
in the case of an equity investment, such as that of Rio Tinto plc, whose
investment is not directly in a mining operation in Indonesia but rather in
its Australian subsidiary, Rio Tinto LTD, which holds the mining in-
vestment, a finding of compliance is not automatic. While the UK-Indo
184. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. llI(1)(a); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
185. See FIL of 1967, supra note 19, arts. 10 et seq.; see also Somarajah, ICSID, supra
note 83, at 69, 79-80 (discussing the conditionality of admission of investment under the FIL
of 1967); supra Section II.A.1.
186. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(1)(a); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
187. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(l)(a); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art.
2(1).
188. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, arts. II(1), III(1).
189. Id.
190. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. II(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
11(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
191. See FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 8 (establishing the Cow system).
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BIT recognizes equity investments, according to a plain reading of pro-
visions governing its scope, such an equity investment must have been
specifically admitted into Indonesia under the FIL of 1967 to be eligible
for protection. 92 Thus, any attempt by Rio Tinto plc to invoke the protec-
tions of the UK-Indo BIT could be challenged on the grounds that Rio
Tinto plc's investment was never admitted to Indonesia under the FIL of
1967 but was admitted into, and made in, Australia, and therefore is not
eligible for protection.93
ii. General Conditions Once Admitted
Article 26 of the FIL of 1967 provides as a general matter that
"[f]oreign capital enterprises are obligated to manage and control their
enterprise.., without harming the interests of the state."'94 Therefore, it
is arguable that if the operation of the mines has harmed the interest of
the State of Indonesia, the mining companies' investments are no longer
in accordance with the FL of 1967 and so are outside the scope of the
three instruments. 95 The GOI could argue, for example, that mining
companies which insist on employing open-pit mining procedures in
protected forests are managing their enterprises in a way that harms the
interest of the State. According to their functional definition, protected
forests are meant to protect local hydrology and the life-support systems
it. Open-pit mining creates both systemic andwhich depend upon i  pnptm ngcets ei n
dramatic incidental risks of major marine pollution. 7 Therefore, insist-
ing on employing open-pit mining in protected forests directly harms the
Indonesian State's interest as articulated in the BFL of 1999. '98 Thus,
such an investment is no longer in accord with the FIL of 1967 and is
outside the three instruments' respective scopes of protection.'99
192. See UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. l(a)(ii), 2(1).
193. It is important also to distinguish this situation from those involving the right of a
parent company to participate in arbitration under an agreement concluded between its sub-
sidiary and the host-State. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 174, para. 209. In the latter cases
the issue concerns ratione personae, while the instant case concerns ratione materiae, and
thus the reasoning of one does not apply to the other. It is one thing for an ICSID tribunal to
conclude that the parent company was always a party to the agreement, which provided for
arbitration, it is another to allow companies to skirt the requirements of host-States regarding
the definition of investments, the constitution of which was left completely to the State's dis-
cretion. See id. at 124, para. 88.
194. FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 26.
195. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
11(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1); see also FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 26.
196. BFL of 1999, supra note 1, art. 1(8).
197. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the environmental
effects of open-pit mining.
198. See BFL of 1999, supra note 1. art. 1(8).
199. See FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 26; Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. III(l)(a);
ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. II(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
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iii. Specific Conditions Once Admitted-
Compliance with CoW Terms
In addition to the general requirements, with which all foreign in-
vestment admitted into Indonesia must comply,2" the FIL of 1967
specifically requires foreign mining to be done in Indonesia, "on the ba-
sis of," viz. in compliance with, a CoW concluded with the GOI 0'
Compliance with the terms of the CoW, therefore, is necessary in order
for a foreign mining operation to be in accordance with the FIL of 1967
and thus within the scope of the three treaties' protections."'
All CoWs concluded since 1974 require the holder of a CoW to con-
form its operation to all applicable environmental regulations as well as
employ the most advanced environmental technologies available. 3
Therefore, failure by the mining companies to comply with all applica-
ble environmental regulations and employ the most advanced
environmental technologies would constitute a violation of this require-
ment. This by extension would violate article 8 of the FIL of 1967 and
so the terms of the investment's admission, thereby removing the in-
vestment from the scope of any of the three treaties.05
2. Qualification of the Dispute
Assuming that their investments qualify for protection, the mining
companies would also be required to show that they have a legal dispute
with the GOI and that the dispute related directly to the qualified invest-
ment. 2°' The requirement that the dispute be "legal" in nature is fairly
self-explanatory and rarely is an issue in jurisdictional challenges.0 7 The
required relationship between the dispute and the investment, however,
has been more contentious. In fact, a recent ruling on a similar issue in a
200. See, e.g., FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 26.
201. Id. art. 8.
202. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. HlI(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
11(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(l).
203. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14,
arts. 22-23.
204. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14,
arts. 22-23.
205. See FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 8; Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. llI(1)(a);
ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, arts. 1(1), III(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
206. See Washington Convention (ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25(1) ("legal disputes
arising directly out of an investment"); Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(1) ("a dispute
between a Party and an investor of the other Party relating to an investment"); ASEAN MIT,
supra note 9, art. X(I) ("[any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between any
Contracting Party and a national or company of any of the other Contracting Parties"); UK-
Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1) ("any dispute that may arise in connection with the invest-
ment").
207. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 106, para. 46.
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NAFTA Chapter 11 claim shows the possible efficacy of this requirement
in the context of some more attenuated regulatory expropriation claims
by investors.208 However, in light of the fact that the ban on open-pit min-
ing directly relates to the manner in which the investment in question is
allowed to operate, it is not likely that the GOI would have much success
arguing this point.2l
C. The GOI's Consent
The final hurdle, and the "cornerstone" of international commercial
arbitration, and arbitration at ICSID in particular, is consent to the juris-
diction of the tribunal by both parties to the dispute.2 0 In traditional
commercial arbitration the consent of both parties is generally embodied
in an arbitration clause contained either in a more general contract gov-
erning the transaction between parties, or more rarely in a contract
dealing solely with dispute resolution. 21' There is, however, no require-
ment that the consent of both parties be embodied in a single document,
thus, it is possible for a State to preemptively consent to arbitrate a wide
212
range of disputes through a provision contained in an IIA. However,
208. Methanex Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28, para. 147. The tribunal held that
NAFrA article 1101(1), which limits the jurisdiction of Chapter 11 tribunals to claims based
on host country measures "relating to" investors or investments, "signifies something more
than the mere effect of a measure on an investor on an investment and that it requires a legally
significant connection between them." Id. Thus, standing alone, a regulation which banned the
gasoline additive MBTE had a legally insignificant connection to the claimant, which did not
manufacture MBTE itself but rather a component of it. Id. para. 150. The exact contours of
this holding are difficult to state with certainty. However, according to one observer close to
the case, its outer boundaries are defined by measures directly regulating "what the investor
can do with its investment," on the one hand, and "a measure of general application that has
no legal application to an investor but may have an incidental economic impact" on the other.
HOWARD MANN, REVIEW OF THE DECISION ON JURISDICTION OF THE METHANEX TRIBUNAL
(AUG. 5, 2002) 4 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., 2002), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/trade-methanexanalysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
209. It might seem tempting to argue in the case of Rio Tinto plc that any effect on its
investment was indirect, due to the fact that its investment was actually in Rio Tinto LTD and
the ban directly affected the investment of Rio Tinto LTD rather than Rio Tinto plc. However,
it is now well established that "[t]he requirement of directness relates to the dispute in relation
to the investment. It does not relate to the investment as such." SCHREUER, supra note 129, at
113, para. 63; see also Fedax v. Rep. of Venez., Decision of Objections to Jurisdiction, Int'l
Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ARB/96/3 (July 1I, 1997), reported in 24A Y.B. COM.
ARB. 23, para. 10 (1999).
210. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 131; see also Washington Convention
(ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25 ("The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dis-
pute ... which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.").




whether or not it will have this effect will depend a great deal upon the
wording of the provision."'
At one end of the spectrum are arbitration provisions, requiring the
host-State to give favorable consideration to a request by an investor for
the host country to submit to arbitration, which essentially leaves the
host country's decision whether to consent to arbitration up to its own
discretion.1 4 At the other end of the spectrum are clauses which explic-
itly or implicitly embody the host country's consent to arbitrate, giving
.... 211
the tribunal automatic jurisdiction. In the middle are clauses providing
that the host country "shall assent to any demand" or some other such
wording, which do not give the investor an immediate right to compel
arbitration, but rather create an "international obligation" in the host-




None of the three treaties leave the GOI's decision whether to con-
sent purely up to its own discretion.2 7 However, only the Aus-Indo BITS 211
gives an investor an immediate right to ICSID arbitration on demand.
The ASEAN MIT grants an investor an immediate right to arbitration,
but only to ad hoc arbitration.2' 9 Access to other more formal arbitration
bodies, including arbitration under ICSID, is dependent on mutual
agreement, which the GOI is free to withhold.22 0 The UK-Indo BIT, goes
one step further (or shorter), creating only an "international obligation"
in the GOI to consent to an investor's request to arbitration at ICSID. 2
1. Aus-Indo BIT
The Aus-Indo BIT states that if a dispute between an investor and
host-State cannot be reconciled through negotiation and consultation, the
investor "may submit the dispute, for settlement" to either the
213. Id. It is interesting to note that Somarajah disputes the ability of even the strongest
language contained in an IA to create personal jurisdiction for the tribunal in the absence of
an arbitration clause in the original contract between the investor and the government. "What
the treaty seeks to protect is the obligation to arbitrate, undertaken in the contract between the
foreign investor and the host-state." SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 267. While this is an in-
teresting argument it is unclear from the case law what its chances of success are before a
tribunal. However, given the existence of arbitration clauses in all CoWs it is not necessary
here to examine this question. See Hoed, supra note 14, at 222.
214. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 133; SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 268.
215. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 134. Subject possibly to the limitation de-
scribed by Sornarajah. See supra note 213.
216. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 268; DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 134.
217. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(2); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
218. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(2).
219. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(4).
220. See id. arts. X(2)-(3).
221. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
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host-State's domestic courts or to ICSID arbitration. 2  Wording of this
kind, which gives the investor a unilateral right to submit the dispute,
embodies the implicit consent of the host-State to the arbitration.2 3 Thus,
assuming no problems related to investment qualification issues dis-
cussed above, any of the mining companies which manage to qualify as
Australian investors have an immediate right to arbitration.
2. ASEAN MIT
The ASEAN MIT similarly requires that the disputing parties first
attempt to resolve the dispute amicably. If agreement cannot be reached
after six months, "either party may submit the dispute for conciliation or
arbitration and such election shall be binding on the other party., 2 4 How-
ever, the treaty requires further agreement between the parties regarding
the choice of an arbitration institution. 5 Failing such an agreement after
three months (on top of the six month initial waiting period), the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will appoint an ad hoc
panel.26 The GOI, therefore, if it believed that its chances might be nega-
tively affected by arbitration at the ICSID tribunal or before another
listed arbitral institution,227 could stonewall for up to nine months before
the President of the ICJ would step in and establish a panel.2 While the
GOI would thereby lose its ability to shape the constitution of the arbi-
222. Id. art. XI(l)-(2). By phrasing remedy to domestic courts or ICSID arbitration as
mutually exclusive options, the Aus-Indo BIT appears to foreclose any argument that exhaus-
tion of local remedies is a precondition of submission to international arbitration. See
SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 269-71.
223. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 213, para. 292; see also E-mail from Robert
Thompson, Former Secretary General of International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbi-
tration, to Stuart Gross (Dec. 30, 2002, 11:05 A.M. EST) (on file with author).
224. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2). It is interesting to note that this clause allows
"either party" to submit the dispute. Id. (emphasis added). Though there may well be issues
regarding the investor's consent to such arbitration, this clause raises the possibility that the
GOI could, for example, preemptively launch a claim against the Thai mining company Banpu
for their failure to desist from utilizing open-pit mining in protected forests in contravention of
the conditions of their investment's admittance, including the responsibility to obey all envi-
ronmental regulations and to manage their enterprise in a manner which is in the interest of
the State. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. II(1); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at
269 (discussing this possibility). The Aus-Indo BIT, like the UK-Indo BIT, prevents against
this possibility by vesting the right to launch arbitration proceedings firmly in the investor
alone. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XI(2); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1). The
control of the investor over the process is further reinforced in Aus-Indo BIT article XI(5)(b),
which grants the investor the right to choose between conciliation or arbitration if the investor
and host-State cannot agree on either. Id. art. XI(5)(b).
225. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(2).
226. Id.
227. Sornarajah, ICSID, supra note 83, at 94 (discussing the perception of the GOI and
other governments in the developing world that ICSID tribunals have a pro-business bias).
228. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. X(4).
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tral tribunal and likely risk subjecting itself to a less well-structured pro-
cedure, the strategy could also work to its advantage. The delay could
compel the investor to drop the claim or settle for less than was initially
demanded, and a tribunal constituted by the president of the ICJ would
likely have a strong public law flavor that might be more sympathetic to
Indonesia's cause.229 Thus, in the case of Banpu, it may be in the GOI's
interest to simply ignore any requests for arbitration until Banpu either
gives up or goes to the ICJ.
3. UK-Indo BIT
The UK-Indo BIT contains the least effective consent to arbitration;
it states that the host country "shall assent to any request on the part of'
an investor from the other contracting party for submission of a dispute
for conciliation or arbitration at ICSID.23 ° According to almost all au-
thorities, this creates only an "international obligation" in the GOI to
consent rather than actually embodying that consent itself.2 ' Thus, as-
suming that the GOI was not inclined on its own to consent to
jurisdiction, Rio Tinto plc would have to depend upon the diplomatic
pressure of the British government in order to convince the GOI to con-
sent to arbitration. Without such consent an ICSID tribunal would not
have jurisdiction to hear the case.232
IV. ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS
If the mining companies' claims were able to survive the many juris-
dictional hurdles described above, they would fail at adjudication on the
231
merits. In light of statements by mining industry insiders as well as the
general tendency among investor suits of this kind, it appears that the
mining companies would most likely base their claims on guarantees of
fair and equitable treatment and expropriation provisions contained in
each treaty.2" Neither of these claims would prevail.
229. Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection
and 'Regulatory Taking'in International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 811, 823 (2001) (dis-
cussing the likely difference in interpretations reached by "commercial arbitrators" as opposed
to those reached by "a court composed of more statist or environmentalist members" on, par-
ticularly, the issue of indirect expropriation).
230. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
231. See, e.g., DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 134; SORNARAJAH, supra note 21,
at 268; SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 216, para. 297.
232. See Washington Convention (ICSID), supra note 40, art. 25.
233. See supra Part III.
234. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 1(2), VI; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, arts. IV(3),
VI; UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, arts.' 3, 5. See Aspinal, supra note 10; see also, e.g.,
Methanex Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28; Pope & Talbot Award on Merits, supra note
Spring 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
A. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Like virtually all IIAs, the three instruments guarantee "fair and eq-
uitable treatment" of covered investments.13' These vaguely worded
provisions have been described as the "alpha and omega of investor-state
arbitration. 236 Every pending and decided NAFTA Chapter 11 claim is,
or was, based in part on a claimed breach of this guarantee, and a similar
trend is apparent among BIT claims.237 The reasons for this trend are
likely twofold. First, such an inherently vague concept allows, as one
commentator put it, "virtually any government action [to] be called un-
fair or inequitable." '238 Second, as will be discussed in detail in Section B
below, NAFTA, BIT, and other tribunals, have consistently rejected
broadly phrased claims of indirect expropriation, refusing to extend the
protection to incidental, incomplete interference with investment value.239
Thus, investors who feel that they have been in some way "wronged" by
a host-State and suffered a decrease in the value of their investment as a
result, predictably articulate their claims under the rubric of unfair and
inequitable treatment.
The mining companies' fair and equitable claim would most likely
be phrased in three ways. First, they would likely complain that it was
unfair and inequitable for the GOI to unilaterally and completely ban
open-pit mining in protected forests without first consulting with the
companies and/or the GOI should have enforced the ban in stages to al-
low mining companies to recoup some of their investments.2 0 Second,
the determination of protected forest boundaries is arbitrary in light of
the already denuded quality of some such areas, and so it is unfair and
inequitable to restrict mining companies' procedures on this basis.24
Third, in light of uncertain boundaries of some protected forests, it is
unfair and inequitable to base restrictions on mining companies' proce-
dures upon them.2 2 As will be shown below, given the GOI's solid
statutory and contractual basis for its actions and the deference which
28; S. D. Myers Award, supra note 28; Metalclad Award, supra note 28; Pope & Talbot In-
terim Award, supra note 28; Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 28.
235. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 11(2); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IV(3);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 3.
236. Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter 11, 96 AM.
SoC'v OF INT'L L. PROC. 9, 9 (2002) (remarks of Charles H. Bower speaking particularly
about claims under NAFrA Chapter 11).
237. Id.; see supra note 43.
238. Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter 11, supra note
233, at 16 (remarks of J.C. Thomas).
239. See infra Section IV.B.





tribunals grant such actions, these claims could only be successful if evi-
dence was presented that the government was motivated by a
discriminatory or bad faith purposes; there is no such evidence.
1. The Standard
Significant disagreement exists as to whether treaty guarantees of
fair and equitable treatment guarantee a minimum international standard
of treatment or something higher. To complicate matters further, dis-
agreement also exists regarding exact definition of a minimum
international standard. As one treatise, quoted recently by a tribunal, put
it, adjudicating a claim under the U.S.-Estonia BIT, "[t]he basic point
would seem to be that there is no single standard.'243 That said, on the
basis of a plain reading of the provisions themselves and the decisions of
tribunals which have interpreted them so far, one can conclude that these
provisions guarantee investors basic rights of fairness and due process,
both administratively and judicially, which are rarely implicated when a
State acts within its statutory authority. Before getting to this, however, it
is necessary to first air the persistent conflict between the two standards.
It is par for the course for those arguing for a higher standard of
treatment to quote the following passage by F.A. Mann:2"
The terms 'fair and equitable treatment' envisage conduct far
beyond a minimum standard and afford protection to a greater
extent and according to a much more objective standard than any
previously employed form of words. A tribunal would not be
concerned with a minimum, maximum or average standard. It
will have to decide whether in all the circumstances the conduct
in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable. No stan-
dard defined by other words is likely to be material. The terms
are to be understood and applied independently and autono-
mousIy.
245
243. Genin Award, supra note 43, n. 15.
244. This short passage contained in a brief note preceding the text of the then-recently
concluded BIT between the Philippines and the United Kingdom, has had a disproportionate
impact on the thinking of commentators and tribunals,. which often quote the above passage
verbatim as the basis for a concurring conclusion. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Award on Merits,
supra note 28, n.105; S.D. Myers Merits,.supra note 28, para. 265 (noting, but rejecting the
conclusion); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 59; Fair and Equitable Treatment Under
NAFTA's Investment Chapter I1, supra note 233, at 17 (Jack C. Cole remarks in Annual Meet-
ing).
245. F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1981).
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According to Mann these clauses must be additive, because other-
wise "nothing is gained by introducing" them. In all due respect,
however, this logic is flawed.
Quite often treaties reiterate rules of customary international law
without supposing to add to their content, particularly in instances where
there exists disagreement over the existence of such a rule or its exact
composition.4 7 In the case of a minimum international standard of "fair
and equitable" treatment, competing understandings have existed as to
whether that standard is relative or absolute.4 8 Some States, particularly
in Latin America, have argued that the standard only requires national
treatment, while others, traditionally capital-exporting countries, have
argued that the standard is independent.249 It may be, as some claim, that
the independent standard has won out.2 ' However, if this is so, it is only
a recent occurrence,251 and likely caused in large part by the efforts of
capital-exporting States to establish it as such through means such as the
inclusion of absolute guarantees of treatment in IIAs.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that these pro-
visions embody a minimum international standard that is only violated
by "egregious" conduct by the State. 52 The classic formulation of this
standard was issued by the General Claims Commission of the United
States and Mexico in the Neer Claim, 253 which stated
the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute international de-
linquency should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so
246. Id. at 244.
247. The compensation provisions of BITs are a perfect example of this. According to
Vandevelde, one of the main purposes behind the U.S. effort to conclude BITs was to reassert
its understanding of customary international law, requiring full compensation for expropria-
tion, in the face of competing understandings, suggesting only "appropriate" compensation
was required. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 98, at 21.
248. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 90
(6th ed. 1992); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 525 (4th ed.
1990).
249. See AKEHURST, supra note 248, at 90; BROWNLIE, supra note 248, at 525.
250. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 931 (Robert Jennings & Author Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 58.
251. It is interesting in this regard to note the statement in the seventh edition of Oppen-
heim's treatise published in 1948, that "[i]ndividuals who enter foreign territory submit
themselves to the law of the land, and their home state has no right to request that they should
be treated otherwise than as the law of the land authorises a state to treat its own subjects." L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 329-30 (7th ed. 1948) (emphasis added).
252. See Pope & Talbot Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 109 (reiterating Canada's
claim in this regard).
253. See AKEHURST, supra note 248, at 91; BROWNLIE, supra note 248, at 525.
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far short of international standards that every reasonable and im-
partial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.
254
More contemporarily, an ICSID tribunal recently stated that "in or-
der to amount to a violation of [a] BIT [guarantee of fair and equitable
treatment] any procedural irregularity would have to amount to bad faith,
willful disregard of due process of law or an extreme insufficiency of
action," such that the act in question amounted to "an arbitrary act that
violates the tribunal's 'sense of juridical propriety.' ,,25 While some tri-
bunals might not take a position quite as extreme, it does appear that
something close to this standard is generally applied.
2. Cases Applying It
While tribunals differ as to whether they refer to a minimum interna-
tional standard, the bulk of the BIT and NAFTA cases which have dealt
with the issue, appear to apply a standard close to a minimum interna-
tional standard. In the situations where a violation was found, evidence
was presented showing bad faith, discriminatory intent, and/or ultra vires
actions on the part of host-State government officials. In all other in-
stances, including instances where host-State actions were not the model
of clarity or fairness but which were legally justified and non-
discriminatory, no violation was found.
In Genin v. Estonia, a case decided recently under the U.S.-Estonia
BIT, the tribunal chose explicitly to apply the minimum international
standard, stating that only acts which amounted to "bad faith, a willful
disregard of due process of law or an extreme insufficiency of action"
would rise to the level of violation, while simple procedural irregularities
would not.26 On this basis the tribunal found that the government's deci-
sion to revoke the investor's banking license for seemingly technical
reasons and without prior notice was not a breach of its BIT obliga-
tions.257 Chief among the factors leading to this conclusion was that
Estonia's actions were within its statutory authority, according to appli-
cable procedural rules, and within reason under the circumstances. 258
Thus, its actions "cannot be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory
against the foreign investors in the sense which those words are used in
the BIT."259 Therefore, while the tribunal found that the government's
254. Neer Claim, 4 R. I. A. A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926).
255. Genin Award, supra note 43, para. 54 (quoting ELSI Case (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 ICJ
15, 73-77).
256. Genin Award, supra note 43, para. 54.
257. Id. para. 48.
258. Id. paras. 46, 47.
259. Id. paras. 46, 47.
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decision "invites criticism, it does not rise to the violation of any provi-
sion of the BIT."26
In the Maffenzini v. Spain case, brought under the Argentine-Spain
BIT, the tribunal, while not explicitly adopting the minimum interna-
tional standard, expressed a similar deference to the decisions by State
officials made pursuant to statutory authority as well as a limitation on
the sorts of responsibilities that may be imputed to States. The tribunal
first dismissed the investor's claim that he was misled by faulty feasibil-
ity studies by Spanish authorities which allegedly underestimated the
cost of the project's completion.26 It "emphasize[d] that Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business
judgments," and that while the study may have been faulty the State had
no more responsibility in this regard than would a similarly placed pri-
vate actor. 62 Second, the tribunal rejected the investor's claim that the
State should pay for the cost of the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) it conducted, noting the deep statutory authority for requiring an
EIA and the fact that the applicable BIT "calls for the promotion of in-
vestments in compliance with national legislation."'263 The tribunal found
for the investor on only one issue, an unauthorized transfer of funds
made by the State authorities from the investor's bank account.26" While
the tribunal articulated the violation in terms of a "lack of transpar-
ency,' 265 elsewhere it stated "the lack of prior or later legally binding
contract formalizing the transaction compels the conclusion that this de
facto arrangement cannot be opposed to the claimant against his con-
sent.' 266 Thus, it appears that what bothered the tribunal was the ultra
vires nature of the government's actions, rather than some general lack
of transparency.
The better known decisions of ICSID tribunals constituted to hear
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims under NAFTA's article 1105 generally, evince
a similar "deference that international law generally extends to the right
of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their borders," finding
violations only when evidence is presented showing an intent by gov-
ernment officials to discriminate or otherwise disadvantage the
investor.16 Thus, the S.D. Myers v. Canada tribunal found that while an
260, Id. para. 48.
261. Maffenzini Award, supra note 43, para. 90.
262. Id. para. 90.
263. Id. para. 96 (emphasis added).
264. Id. para. 103.
265. Id.
266. Id. para. 99.
267. . S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 263. Note the slightly unique
language of the applicable NAFTA provision. See NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 1105 ("Each
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investor could not claim to have been treated unfairly and inequitably
simply on the grounds that the government enacted possibly misguided
environmental regulation which affected the investor negatively, but a
claim by an investor that such regulation was not enacted on the basis of
a good faith belief in its efficacy but rather to protect local industry to
the detriment of the claimant could be sustained.268 Similarly, the Pope &
Talbot v. Canada tribunal rejected a number of claims such as the lack of
an appeal in certain administrative contexts and other regulatory lacunae
and fees which the investor claimed affected its investments' profitability
unfairly.269 Only a series of actions taken by government personnel after
the investor filed its Chapter 11 complaint, which evinced an almost in-
vective intent to -harm the investor, violated article 1105.270
The only major outlier in this regard might appear to be Metalclad v.
21Mexico. In Metalclad, the tribunal extrapolated from a distinct provi-
sion of the NAFTA regarding transparency to find that a government
violated fair and equitable treatment guarantees when it failed to assure
that "all affected investors of another party" are aware of "all relevant
legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing, and success-
fully operating investments made, or intended to be made. 272 However,
on challenge by Mexico, a Canadian court annulled this part of the deci-
sion, on the grounds that there was no basis in the NAFTA article 1105
for such a transparency requirement.273 It is interesting also to note that,
in addition to these transparency concerns, the tribunal's decision was
based on a determination that the municipal authority had acted ultra
vires in its decisions regarding the investor and with the intent to obstruct
274the investment.
Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.")
268. Id. paras. 162, 195, 268.
269. Pope & Talbot Award on Merits, supra note 28, paras. 120-65, 182.
270. Id. para. 181. (these actions included making intentional misstatements regarding
the claimant's operations and conduct, threatening the claimant, and denying the claimant's
requests for information).
271. See Metalclad Award, supra note 28.
272. Id.
273. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 0664, para. 70 (2001)
(the exact grounds were that in so doing the tribunal had exceeded its terms of reference and
so acting ultra vires). This clearly belies Mann's statement that "other provisions of the
Agreements affording substantive protection are no more than examples of specific instances
of this overriding duty" of fair and equitable treatment. See Mann, supra note 245, at 243; see
also S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 267 ("The language of the NAFrA
does not support the notion espoused by Dr. Mann insofar as it is considered to support a
breach of Article 1105 that is based on a violation of another provision of Chapter 11.").
274. Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 106; Todd Weiler, Assistant Professor, Uni-
versity of Windsor Law School, Lecture at the University of Michigan Law School (Feb. 6,
2003).
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3. Application to Our Facts
Under the standard articulated by these cases, the mining companies'
fair and equitable claims would fail. This is principally because the en-
actment of a ban on open-pit mining was firmly within the authority of
the Indonesian Congress, and was enacted for reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory purposes."5 The principle function of protected forests is the
protection of hydrology, and open-pit mining presents an almost uncon-
trollable risk of marine pbllution. 76 Thus, unless some evidence surfaced
showing intent to discriminate against the mining companies, this would
appear to be just the kind of government regulation to which interna-
tional law traditionally gives deference.277 Even if an area was already
denuded, the ban still is not arbitrary considering the impact of open-pit
mining on downstream communities and the ban's function, inter alia, to
protect these communities.27
In light of this almost unimpeachable statutory authority, it seems
unlikely that a tribunal would even inquire as to whether any effort was
taken to notify the mining companies prior to the measure's enactment.
However, if a tribunal did so, the measure would withstand the inquiry.
The mining companies were notified at the conclusion of their respective
CoWs by terms of the CoWs themselves that their operations would be
subject to restrictive environmental regulations.279 In addition to casting
doubt on whether any right of the mining companies was being inter-
fered with or diminished at all, let alone unfairly or inequitably, these
clauses put mining companies on notice from the start that they would be
subject to changing environmental regulation.8 ° That risk was clearly
spelled out and accepted by the mining companies, the three instruments
in no way "insured" them against it."' Finally, it is arguable that by vir-
tue of operating in a heavily regulated industry, the companies were on
constructive notice that they would be subject to significant regulation at
any time . 2 The fact that the measure was enforced all at once rather than
275. INDON. CONST. art. 20.
276. BFL of 1999, supra note 1, art. 1(8); see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
277. S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 263.
278. BFL of 1999, supra note 1, art. 1(8); see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
279. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14,
arts. 22-23.
280. See infra Sections IV.B. 1.
281. Maffenzini Award, supra note 43, art. 90; see also FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 1
(explicitly assigning the investor the risk of investment).
282. According to the heavily regulated industry doctrine of U.S. jurisprudence, persons
operating in industries which are routinely subject to very high levels of government regula-
tion, such as mining or nuclear power, operate with the expectation of such regulation. See,
e.g., Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 488 U.S. 819 (1988); Bowen v. Pub.
Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
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in stages may possibly "invite[] criticism [but] ... does not rise to the
violation of any provision of the BIT.
283
The only possible leg the claim could stand on is that regarding
shifting protected forest borders.2  It would not appear from the cases
discussed above that mere uncertainty regarding these borders and noth-
ing more would rise to the level of unfair and inequitable treatment.
However, if it was shown that government officials intentionally shifted
borders as a means to extort bribes or otherwise disadvantage the mining
companies, such behavior would likely qualify. However, such action
would need to have been taken after the enactment of the ban, otherwise
there would be no basis for extortion. There is no evidence of that fact.285
All told, on the basis of the information available, and in the absence
of any extraordinary revelations of extortion or the like, there is no basis
for the mining companies' fair and equitable claim. The way in which
the ban was enacted could have been done in a manner that was less dis-
ruptive to the mining companies' operations, and it is likely that in a
developing nation consisting of over 14,000 inhabited islands that ad-
ministrative procedures and border demarcations sometimes are not the
model of clarity. But this does not make the GOI's actions unfair or in-
equitable. Certain risks attach to doing business in developing countries,
especially business that traditionally involves heavy government regula-
tion, and the mining companies were aware of this risk. It was, in fact,
spelled out to them in the contract they made with the GOI, and in the
FIL of 1967.286 As the ICSID tribunal in Maffenzini stated, "Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties are not insurance polices against bad business
judgments ... [and][w]hile it is probably true that there were shortcom-
ings in the policies and practices" of the GOI, "they cannot be deemed to
relieve the investors of the business risk inherent in any investment."287
B. Indirect Expropriation
The most prominent (and controversial) provisions in the short tradi-
tion of investor-State dispute resolution under HAs have been those
guaranteeing investors compensation for not only direct expropriation,
283. Genin Award, supra note 43, para. 48.
284. See Aspinal, supra note 10.
285. In addition, if the companies in fact gave in to such demands, there may be issues
regarding their qualification for protection under the instruments. See supra Section HI.B.1.b.i
(discussing the potential effect of evidence of corruption on the mining companies' efforts to
qualify their investment for protection).
286. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14, arts.
22-23; FIL of 1967, supra note 19, art. 1.
287. Maffenzini Award, supra note 43, para. 90.
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but also for measures claimed to be "equivalent to expropriation." '288
While, as intimated above, anecdotal evidence suggests a movement fa-
voring claims based on fair and equitable treatment provisions rather
than expropriation, it certainly would be premature to write them off.
289
The instant situation is no exception.
The mining companies would likely articulate a claim under the in-
direct expropriation provisions contained in the three treaties on the
basis that the ban on open-pit mining makes exploration and extraction
economically unfeasible and so is equivalent to, or has the equivalent
effect of, an expropriation of their rights embodied in the CoWs. 29° Aspi-
nal intimates as much when he asks rhetorically regarding the ban,
"Have these contracts now been broken by the Republic of Indonesia? If
so, is the government going to reimburse regulated companies? '29 ' He
argues that the low discovery rate of mineral deposits makes exploration
costly, and can only be recovered through utilization of open-pit mining
patterns.292 Thus, the ban is equivalent to canceling the contracts of the
"regulated companies. 293
The problem with this argument is apparent both in his phrase,
"regulated companies" and the analogy he makes.9 As regulated com-
panies, the rights companies attained under their respective CoWs, were
always subject to GOI authority to regulate their conduct, particularly
regarding environmental concerns. Thus, no right has been expropriated
when they are in fact regulated. However, even if that were not the case,
the ban on open-pit mining does not eliminate the mining companies'
rights to extract minerals, but restricts the manner in which that right can
be invoked. A smaller fishhook is not the same thing as no fishhook at
all. As the discussion below will show, an analysis of the decisions by
various tribunals which have addressed the issue of indirect expropria-
tion demonstrate that an investor must show: 1) that he had a right to
something, 2) that right was completely or almost completely frustrated
by the actions of the host-State, and possibly 3) that the action com-
plained of involved a transfer of a benefit to the State or a third party.
The mining companies' claim satisfies none of these conditions.
288. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. VI(l).
289. See supra note 43.
290. See Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. IV(I); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IV(I);
UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 5(1); see also Aspinal, supra note 10.
291. Aspinal, supra note 10.
292. See id. (claiming that the discovery ratio is only about 1:1000 which forces a com-
pany to invest millions to search for minerals that they may or may not find).
293. Id. (likening the ban on open-pit mining to requiring fishermen to "only use one-




1. A Right to Expropriate
The mining companies' indirect expropriation claim should fail in
the first instance, because the right which they allege has been expropri-
ated-the right to employ open-pit patterns in protected forests-never
existed. Their right to mine was always subject to environmental regula-
tion both as a matter of general principles and pursuant to the specific
legal arrangement under which that right was created. Thus, when envi-
ronmental regulation, such as the ban on open-pit mining in protected
forests, affects the operation of that right, it has not been infringed, nor
have the mining companies' good faith expectations been violated.
The right to operate a business is always subject to a number of con-
ditions, implicit and explicit, which define the boundaries of that right.295
The most general of those boundaries constrains a business from operat-
ing in a manner that endangers the public. It simply has no right to do so;
and when such action is prohibited, no right has been infringed. The
situation does not change when that business is operated by a foreign
investor. By establishing an investment in a State, the investor becomes
subject to that State's laws, and thereby its rights are defined.296
Nor is this situation greatly altered by the conclusion of a typical
BIT.297 As each of the three instruments make clear, the host-State's duty
to promote and protect investment, and the rights of investors to enter
and operate investments, are "subject to [the host-State's] laws. '29 In
Maffenzini v. Spain the tribunal pointed to similar provisions in the ap-
plicable BIT in dismissing an investor's demand that the government
compensate him for the costs of a required Environmental Impact As-
sessment (EIA).299 Though the project did not come to fruition, the
295. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 83-84.
296. See id. (quoting Judge Oda's separate opinion in the ELSI Case). Judge Oda's opin-
ion reads:
It is a great privilege to be able to engage in business in a country other than one's
own. By being permitted to undertake commercial or manufacturing activities or
transactions through businesses incorporated in another country, nationals of a for-
eign country will obtain further benefits. Yet these local companies, as legal entities
of that country, are subject to local laws and regulations; so that foreigners may
have to accept a number of restrictions in return for the advantages of doing busi-
ness through such local companies.
ELSI Case (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 90 (July 20) (emphasis added).
297. See, e.g., Maffenzini Award, supra note 43, para. 96.
298. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. 11(3); see also ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art.
111(1) ("All investments to which this Agreement relates shall, subject to this agreement, be
governed by the laws and regulations of the host country... "); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26,
art. 3(1) ("Each party shall encourage [investment] ... and, subject to its right to exercise
powers conferred by its laws, shall admit such capital.").
299. Maffenzini Award, supra note 43, para. 96 (emphasis added).
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tribunal cited the thorough Spanish and EEC legislative authority on
which the requirement was based, and found that the investor's right to
proceed with the development in question was always subject to the re-
quirement of an EIA and thus no rights of his were infringed when the
government required him to conduct one.30O
While the Maffenzini tribunal's formulation was somewhat unique, it
is closely analogous to the distinction tribunals and commentators often
make "between 'normal regulation' expressing the State's police powers
and 'regulation' amounting to a 'taking.' ,,3o A recent Chapter 11 tribunal
in Feldman v. Mexico held that it was necessary to distinguish between
legitimate exercises of police powers by a host-State and expropriatory
exercises, on the grounds that
governments must be free to act in the broader public interest
through protection of the environment, new or modified tax re-
gimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies,
reductions or increases in tariff level, imposition of zoning re-
strictions and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation of
this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely af-
fected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that
customary international law recognizes this.02
300. Id.
301. Waelde & Kolo, supra note 229, at 821.
302. Id. para. 103; see also S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 281 ("[t]he
general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropria-
tion"); id. para. 282 ("governments [should not] be subject to claims as they go about their
business of managing public affairs"); Interlocutory Award No. ITL 55-129-3 (Oct. 28, 1995),
reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 248, 275 ("It is also an accepted principle of international law
that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide 'regulation'
within the accepted police power of states."); United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001
B.C.S.C. 0664, para. 99 (referring to the Metalclad tribunal's formulation of indirect expro-
priation, which included the incidental effects of bona fide regulations, as "extremely broad,"
but refusing to strike it down on the grounds that questions of law are not grounds for striking
down an arbitration award under the applicable statute). Arguably the Pope & Talbot tribunal
rejected a regulation/police powers-based exception to compensible expropriations. See Pope
& Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para. 99. However, elsewhere the opinion quotes at
length the Third Restatement of Foreign Relation's (Restatement) "unreasonable interference"
and "confiscatory" standard of review. Id. para. 99 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712, cmt. g (1987)). Implicit in a standard of
"unreasonable interference," are questions regarding the legitimacy of the interference, i.e.,
whether there was a bona fide reason for it. This is simply another way to ask whether the
interference related to an exercise of traditional police powers to protect the health, welfare,
and safety of a country's people. On the other hand, an action which is "confiscatory" implies
a purpose to "seize (private property) for the public treasury," WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 383 (2d ed. 1983), which would not be a legitimate exercise of
police powers. This is further supported by the opinion's quotation of Restatement § 712
which describes indirect expropriation in the following purpose-based terms, "a state may
seek to achieve the same result [as outright expropriation] by taxation and regulatory measures
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Thus, the tribunal dismissed the investor's claim that restrictions by
the Mexican government on the gray market for cigarettes in the country
had indirectly expropriated his investment, holding that nothing in
NAFTA or Mexican law guaranteed access to such a market and there-
fore the claimant had no right which was deprived when its access was
foreclosed by legitimate government regulation.3 3 Implicit in this formu-
lation is that governments have a right to regulate for bona fide reasons,
and thus, the rights of investors are logically subject to, and limited by,
that right.3M
Few would argue that the GOI does not have the right to enact regu-
lation to protect its people from the highly toxic marine pollution caused
by open-pit mining, especially when the activity is conducted in areas
which are functionally designated to protect water quality.305 The mining
companies' right to mine was created in this context and thus was always
subject to the rights of the GOI.3 6 Nothing in any of the three instru-
ments nor in Indonesian law required the GOI to allow open-pit mining
in protected forests, thus mining companies had no right which was
designed to make continued operation of the project uneconomical." Pope & Talbot Interim
Award, supra note 28, n.87 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra, § 712 n.7) (emphasis added).
303. Feldman Award, supra note 28, paras. 113, 135-36.
304. See id.; see also id. para. 152 ("[I]t may be questioned as to whether the Claimant
ever possessed a 'right' to export that has been 'taken' by the Mexican government."). It is
arguable that language in some awards that emphasizes "reasonably-to-be-expected ... bene-
fit[s]" reflects this formula as well. See, e.g., Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 103
(finding that on the basis of the tribunal's determination of the legal limits of the municipal-
ity's regulatory authority that the municipality had acted ultra vires in the requirements it
imposed on the investor and thus denied the investor the reasonably-to-be-expected benefit of
its investment). The converse of this is that if the government has the legal authority to limit an
investor's rights in certain ways, it has not denied any reasonably-to-be-expected benefit when
it does so. Rather it would be unreasonable for the investor to expect otherwise.
305. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
306. The FIL of 1967 essentially verbalizes this general authority, obliging "[f]oreign
capital enterprises ... to manage and control their enterprises in accordance with the princi-
ples of good business administration and without harming the interests of the state." FIL of
1967, supra note 19, art. 26. It is important in this context to note, again, provisions of the
three instruments which explicitly make investments subject not only to host-State laws, Aus-
Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. llI(l)(a); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. III(l); UK-Indo BIT,
supra note 26, art. 3(1), but in the case of the Aus-Indo BIT and the UK-Indo BIT, subject to
the FIL of 1967. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. Il(l)(a); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art.
2(1). Finally, mining and resource extraction is what is sometimes termed a "heavily regulated
industry." According to U.S. jurisprudence rights in such industries are subject to exceptional
levels of government control and regulation, and thus rarely will a court find a taking when
such a right is infringed by such regulation. See, e.g., Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United
States, 488 U.S. 819 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff, who was forced to cease operating a
plutonium recycling plant after the government denied it an operating permit, could not assert
a takings claim because its property right had always been subject to government regulation of
nuclear facilities).
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deprived when the GOI enacted, for legitimate reasons, measures forbid-
ding it.
The only possible way that the mining companies could claim that
they had such a right is if their respective CoWs specifically granted it to
them. However, the opposite is true. Every CoW concluded since the
mid-seventies has included provisions specifically requiring that mining
companies conform their conduct to environmental regulations as a con-
tinuing condition of their right to mine.3 7 In Tradex v. Albania, an ICSID
tribunal organized to hear an indirect expropriation claim brought under
provisions of Albania's foreign investment law, addressed an analogous
clause in a joint venture contract which stated, "[t]he joint venture will
be also conformed to the necessary addendum will taken place to the
albanian legislation concerning the land (sic the official translation pro-
vided to the Tribunal)."3 8 The tribunal held that this provision made it
"quite clear" to the investor that "the investment was subject to future
applications of the Land Law, in other words: subject to future privatiza-
tions," which formed the basis of the complaint.3 9 Thus, the tribunal
stated that if any actions by the Albanian government were found to be
expropriatory, "it would have to examine whether such rights were in-
deed acquired by Tradex or were covered by the reference to the Land
Law and thus from the very beginning subject to possible privatization
measures." ° The mining companies' rights to mine were unquestionably
subject to possible environmental measures, which indisputably included
the ban.3' Thus a right to employ open-pit mining patterns in protected
forests free from environmental regulation restricting or eliminating that
right, was never "indeed acquired by" the mining companies and so can-
not be said to have been expropriated when it is forbidden for legitimate
environmental reasons. '
307. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note 14, art.
22 ("[olperations must conform to environmental protection laws and regulations"). See supra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of this requirement and in
particular actions and statements by mining companies evincing their understanding of this
provision's prospective effect.
308. Tradex v. Rep. of Alb., Award, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes,
ARB/94/2 (Apr. 29, 1999), reported in 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 221, para. 100 (2000) [hereinafter
Tradex Award].
309. Id. para. 101.
310. Id. para. 102 (emphasis added); see also Feldman Award, supra note 28, para. 128
(finding that the claimant could not prove expropriation when enforcement of a provision in
the law which had been in effect for at least three years prior to the establishment of the in-
vestment resulted in a prohibition of its export business); id. para. 152 ("[I]it may be
questioned as to whether the Claimant ever possessed a 'right' to export that has been 'taken'
by the Mexican government.").
311. See MANSHRECK, supra note 18, at 31; see also, e.g., Inco CoW, supra note .14, art.
22. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
312. Tradex Award, supra note 308, para. 102.
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2. Equivalent: "equal in quantity, value, force, meaning, etc."3 3
If a tribunal decided that the mining companies had a right to mine,
defined in such a way that it could theoretically be expropriated through
environmental regulation (or more likely, if they did not address the is-
sue at all), the mining companies' claim would still fail. While some
have suggested that indirect expropriation may encompass any impair-
ment in an investment's economic value, either incidental or direct,3 4
decisions by tribunals which have addressed the issue suggest otherwise.
A survey of the decisions by various ICSID tribunals addressing the is-
sue in the context of claims based on NAFTA Chapter 11, BITs, and
foreign investment legislation as well as decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights, make clear that partial interference cannot be
termed equivalent to, or tantamount to, expropriation and thus is not
compensable under these provisions. The ban on open-pit mining only
partially interferes with the manner in which mining companies can
mine and only in particular locations. It therefore is not "a measure
equivalent to expropriation"3 '5 nor does it have "an effect equivalent to
expropriation. 31 6
Webster's Dictionary defines "equivalent" as "equal in quantity,
value, force, meaning, etc." '' Thus, the plain meaning of "measures
equivalent to expropriation" is measures that have the same force or
value as an expropriation, while "measures having the equivalent effect
to expropriation" means measures having an effect equal in quantity to
the effect of expropriation.3 8 Tribunals' decisions accord with these for-
mulations, generally holding that "[s]ometing that is equivalent to
something else cannot logically encompass more,"3 9 and so require an
investor to show not only that he had a right but that his ability to use
313. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 474 (2d College ed. 1980).
314. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 102. Dolzer and Stevens continue that
"it could be argued that the state is prevented from taking any measures where it cannot be
covered by public financial resources." Id. at 99-100.
315. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. VI(l).
316. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. VI(I); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 5(1).
317. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 474.
318. See VCLT, supra note 90, art. 31; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. VI(1); Aus-Indo
BIT, supra note 25, art. VI(1); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 5(1).
319. Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para. 104 (cited with approval in S.D.
Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 286). It is interesting to note that while Pope &
Talbot intimated the possibility that "in some contexts and circumstances" a less than com-
plete and permanent deprivation might rise to the level of expropriation, S.D. Myers Award on
Merits, supra note 28, para. 283, it also intimated a requirement that a benefit accrue to the
State or a third party. Id. para. 287. In combination, these holdings suggest that those "con-
texts and circumstances" might be when the State has taken for itself, or granted to another,
part of what the investor had a right to, keeping in mind the definition of "right" discussed
above.
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and enjoy that right was completely or almost completely frustrated by
the actions of the host-State such that the effect was equivalent to expro-
priation.
a. BIT Cases
Claims of indirect expropriation in violation of BIT guarantees have
been raised in two published ICSID decisions; and in both, the tribunals
emphasized that in order to prove an indirect expropriation, the investor
must show that some act by the State caused a deprivation of the invest-
ment in question.32° In Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, the case most
closely on point, the tribunal found that the revocation of a free trade
zone (FTZ) license, which granted certain incentives and exceptions to a
mineral mining enterprise, constituted an indirect expropriation.32' Essen-
tial to this holding was the fact that "the revocation of their FTZ license
forced [the complainants] to stop all activity ... thereby making their
investment completely useless and depriving them of the benefits they
could expect therefrom. 322 Thus, the measure, in the tribunal's opinion,
had a "'similar effect'" to expropriation.323
b. NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases
As the Feldman tribunal noted, though a number of indirect expro-
priation claims have been brought under NAFTA Chapter 11, only one
has succeeded, Metalclad v. Mexico, and "the principle rationale for that
decision was substantially overturned by the reviewing court. 324 Exclud-
ing Feldman, which dismissed the complaint mainly on the basis of the
absence of a right,3 25 all, including the unannulled grounds of Metalclad,
are based upon findings of significant or complete interference (or the
lack thereof) with ownership and control .326 Even the Feldman tribunal,
320. Olguin Award, supra note 43, paras. 26, 47 (ultimately dismissing the claim on the
grounds that the State could not be held responsible for losses caused by a financial crisis);
Goetz Award, supra note 129, para. 63.
321. Goetz Award, supra note 129, para. 63
322. Id.
323. Id. Note also that the applicable convention, the Belgium and Luxemburg Union-
Burundi BIT, contained much broader language than the instant three BITs, protecting against
"measures depriving of, or restricting property rights, or any other measure having similar
effect." Id. para. 62 (emphasis added).
324. Feldman Award, supra note 28, para. 107.
325. See supra Section IV.B. 1, describing both the "lack of right" formulation and inter
alia the Feldman Award.
326. See Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 109; United Mexican States v. Metalclad
Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 0664, para. 97 (2001); Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28,
para. 102; S. D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, paras. 282-83.
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though making clear it was not the principle basis for its decision, noted
this factor.327
According to the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, when determining
"whether a particular interference with business activities amounts to
expropriation, the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restric-
tive to support a conclusion that the property has been 'taken' from the
owner."328 It further refined the standard as one where the interference in
question "would 'justify an inference that the owner... [sic] will not be
able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property ... [sic]. 329 The tribunal
then dismissed the complaint, noting that the investor had remained at all
times in full ownership and control of its investment and had alleged
only a partial "interference" with its export business which it was still
able to continue.3O According to the tribunal this "degree of interference
with the Investment's operations ... does not rise to an expropriation
(creeping or otherwise). 33'
In S.D. Myers the tribunal similarly emphasized the "deprivation of
ownership rights," which generally accompanies measures equivalent to
expropriation. 332 It noted that "[a]n expropriation usually amounts to a
lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic
rights. 333 Thus, the tribunal held that a Canadian export ban, which the
plaintiffs alleged "eliminat[ed] [their] competitive advantage" could not,
in light of the temporary nature of the effect which it had on the com-
plaint's investment, be termed tantamount to expropriation.
Finally, even the unannulled grounds of the Metalclad decision sup-
port this distinction. The tribunal found that the establishment of a cacti
reserve, which encompassed the location of the complainant's toxic
waste dump, "had the effect of barring forever the operation of the land-
fill., 3 5 This is in line with statements elsewhere in the opinion that
indirect expropriation involves "interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or significant part,
327. Feldman Award, supra note 28, para. 142 ("Although the Tribunal does not consider
this a controlling argument, the regulatory action has not deprived the Claimant of control of
his company, CEMSA, interfered directly in the internal operations of CEMSA or displaced
the Claimant as the controlling shareholder.").
328. Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para. 102.
329. Id. (quoting the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens, art. 10(3)).
330. Id. paras. 100-01.
331. Id. para. 102.
332. S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 282.
333. Id. para. 283.
334. Id. para. 284.
335. Metalclad Award, supra note 28, para. 109.
Spring 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
of the use or the reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of prop-
erty.
336
c. European Court of Human Rights and
Foreign Investment Law Decisions
In addition to these decisions under BITs and NAFTA Chapter 11,
various decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, adjudicating
claims under the European Convention on Human Rights, and ICSID
tribunals organized to hear claims under foreign investment laws, have
addressed similar issues and made similar distinctions based on the ex-
tent of the interference complained of.
As Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo point out, the European Court of
Justice, in adjudications of complaints of property owners under the
European Convention on Human Rights, "have been reluctant to award
compensation unless the State measure destroyed all economic value of
the property.' 337 This reluctance was best summed up by the court in Kate
v. Italy, which stated
[w]here, following an administrative decision concerning spe-
cific property, the owner retains the ownership subject to
restrictions which reduce to virtually nothing the economic
value of the use or exchange of the property, this is known as
,value expropriation' and it gives rise to an entitlement to com-
pensation. This situation arises where the restriction is very
severe-absolute prohibition-and where it is imposed for an
indefinite period of time or remains in force for longer than is
reasonable. On the other hand, there is no entitlement to com-
pensation for damage resulting from a restriction which
although imposed for an indefinite period does not have such a
profound effect on the right, or a restriction which is due to
cease within a reasonable time even though it is a very severe
338
one.
The court went on to hold that even though the designation of a park on
land owned by the complainant-developer had dramatically reduced its
value, it did not count as a compensable denial of the owner's property
rights.339
336. Id. para. 103.
337. Waelde & Kolo, supra note 229, at 824.
338. Kate v. Italy, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 368, para. 26 (1995) (emphasis added).
339. Id. para. 29; see also Matos E. Silva v. Portugal, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 573, para. 85
(1997) (holding that a law which created a nature reserve on land including the complainant's
did not amount to expropriation, because while the complainant's right to construct or sell the
land was thereby restricted, the complainant's rights to the land had not disappeared as it
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The most applicable ICSID decision regarding the application of in-
direct expropriation provisions contained within a country's foreign
investment laws came in Tradex v. Albania.3 40 The claim in Tradex was
brought under Albania's Foreign Investment Law which provided for
compulsory arbitration at ICSID, and protection against, inter alia, meas-
ures with effect tantamount to expropriation.14 ' After first prefacing its
discussion in the manner related above,342 the tribunal expressed approval
for a standard of expropriation based on whether an investor's ability to
use and enjoy its property had been substantially interfered with.14' It
then found that a number of actions by the State, which had the potential
to deprive the investor of its right to use the property in question in fact
never did so, and thus could not be termed tantamount to expropria-
tion.3'4 While possibly preventing the investor from using its property,
other actions complained of had not been proved to be attributable to the
State and so could not qualify for protection under the law.4 5 Thus the
tribunal found that while a number of factors had interfered with the in-
vestor's use and enjoyment of its investment, they could not properly be
termed tantamount to expropriation by the government, noting further
that inquiries recently made by the investor regarding loans to invest
could still work the land productively); Fredin v. Sweden, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784, para. 43
(1991) (holding that the decision to revok6 complainant's gravel mining license had to be
viewed in relation to its other properties which were not similarly affected); Pine Valley v.
Ireland, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 319 (1992); Padea v. Italy, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996). But see
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440 (1993) (holding that the physical occu-
pation by the army of the claimant's property had rendered the owner unable to use or enjoy
the property and so amounted to expropriation).
340. Tradex Award, supra note 308; see also S. Pac. Props. v. Egypt (Pyramids), Award,
Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ARB/84/3 (May 20, 1992), reported in 19 Y.B.
CoM. ARB. 51, para. 169 (1994) (finding that the government's withdrawal of its contribution
to the project, its blocking of the claimant's bank accounts, placement of claimant in receiver-
ship, and sequestration of its assets "rendered impossible and impracticable the continuation
of a joint venture between" the claimant and the government instrumentality); Marine Drive
Complex v. Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Ad Hoc UNCITRAL (Oct. 27, 1989),
reported in 19 YB. CoM. ARB. 11, para. 26 ("What is clear is that the conjunction of the stop
work order, the demolition [of parts of the investor's property], the summons, the arrest, the
detention, the requirement of filing assets declaration forms, and the deportation of [the inves-
tor] without possible re-entry had the effect of causing the irreparable cessation of work on the
project ... constitut[ing] a constructive expropriation of MDCL's contractual rights in the
project and accordingly, the expropriation of the value of [the investor's] interest in
MDCL... ").
341. Tradex Award, supra note 308.
342. Id. paras. 100-02. See notes 308-12 and accompanying text for a more complete
discussion of this issue.
343. Id. para. 103.
344. Id. paras. 150-53.
345. Id. para. 158.
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further in the property made it difficult to believe that the property had
been "expropriated."346
d. Application to the Facts at Hand
Aspinal stated that the ban on open-pit mining was equivalent to a
fisherman being forced to fish with a much smaller hook.347 It is not
equivalent to a fisherman not being allowed to fish at all. Nor is it
equivalent to expropriation. The mining companies' rights to search for
and extract minerals have not been extinguished but restricted in the
manner of their operation. The mining companies may still extract min-
erals from areas that are within protected forests using different means,
while those whose CoW includes both protected forest and nonprotected
forest areas may continue to utilize open-pit mining patterns in nonpro-
tected areas. As the foregoing survey of cases show, no major
international tribunal under any analogous law has found such partial
restrictions equivalent to expropriation.3 8 It is unlikely that the mining
companies would find the first.
3. No Transfer of Benefits
If the mining companies' indirect expropriation claim has not failed
already on the above grounds, it would likely finally fail on the grounds
that no benefit was transferred through the ban to the government or a
third party. Many, but not all, tribunals adjudicating indirect expropria-
tion claims, have included in their analysis whether, as a result of the
alleged interference, a benefit was transferred from the complainant to
the government or to a third party.3 49 As with the complete, or almost
complete, deprivation of rights standard described above, the require-
ment that a claimant show that a benefit was transferred from it to the
State or a third party flows logically from the formulation "equivalent to
expropriation."30 Expropriation is often defined not only in terms of dep-
346. Id. paras. 158-59.
347. See Aspinal, supra note 10.
348. As noted by the tribunal in Pope & Talbot most Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions
are inapplicable in this regard as that "tribunal's mandate expressly extends beyond expropria-
tion to include 'other measures affecting property rights.'" Pope & Talbot Interim Award,
supra note 28, para. 104 (quoting Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popu-
lar Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 1 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 9, art. 11).
349. See, e.g., Olguin Award, supra note 43, paras. 26, 47; Pope & Talbot Interim Award
supra note 28, para. 100; S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 287; Tradex
Award, supra note 308, para. 103 (quoting Amcoa case, "a compulsory transfer of property
rights," Amcoa Case, 15 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 220 (1997)).
350. See supra Section IV.B.3.
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rivation of benefits but of a transfer of benefits from a party to the
State.35" ' The reasoning of opinions which address this factor reflects this.
The most explicit formulation of this standard came in a recent BIT
decision Olguin v. Spain. The Olguin tribunal rejected the idea that the
State could be held liable for loss which the investor incurred when his
investment failed in the context of an economic crisis-notwithstanding
alleged guarantees issued by the State-and its negligent management of
State instrumentality involved . 2 According to the tribunal
[t]he Arbitral Tribunal could give expropriation the scope al-
leged by Olguin only if it strayed from the general principles of
law and from the provisions of positive law defining and regulat-
ing expropriation. There is expropriation where there are acts
which can be reasonably deemed to deprive an individual of
property belonging to him, in such a manner that the doer of
such acts directly or indirectly acquires the possession or at
least the profits of the expropriated property. Expropriation also
requires the intention to expropriate; omissions, serious as they
may be, do not suffice for expropriation to exist.3
The tribunal articulated a rule that not only must there be a transfer of
benefits from the investor to the State, but that transfer must have been
the intended effect of the action complained of by the investor.
354
The two Chapter 11 tribunals, Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers, which
addressed the issue, did not do so in terms as strong as those of the 01-
guin tribunal, but still made clear that it was a factor in their analysis. In
Pope & Talbot, the tribunal noted first that "there is no allegation that the
Investment has been Nationalized or that the Regime is confiscatory.""35
The Canadian government officials had not taken over the control of any
of the investor's operations and had not taken any of the benefits of the
business except through taxation.356 The S.D. Myers tribunal similarly
noted that the State "realized no benefit from the measure" in dispute,
and no evidence supported "a transfer of property or benefit directly to
others."357 In addition to the requirement of a transferred benefit which
351. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 495 ("1. to take (land, property,
etc.) from its owner; esp. to take for public use or in the public interest ... 2. to transfer (prop-
erty) from another to oneself .... ").
352. Olguin Award, supra note 43, paras. 19-26.
353. Id. para. 47.
354. Id.
355. Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para. 100.
356. Id.
357. S.D. Myers Award on Merits, supra note 28, para. 287; see also id. para. 280 ("the
term 'expropriation' carries with it the connotation of a 'taking' by a government-type author-
ity of a person's 'property' with a view to transferring ownership of that property to another
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these decisions imply, the Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers decisions also
imply a narrow definition of benefit, which does not include the general
increase in public good that all bona fide regulations seek to effect.358
The ban on open-pit mining effected no transfer of ownership rights
or control to the GOI or third party. The mining companies still own and
control their operations to the extent provided for in their contract. As
discussed above these rights have not been deprived, or even diminished,
and certainly have not been transferred to the GOI or a third party. The
mining companies therefore have no legitimate claim of indirect expro-
priation on which to have based their threat.
V. CONCLUSION-FINAL PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS
As the foregoing demonstrated, the GOI could likely have beaten
some or all of the mining companies' claims at a jurisdictional stage and
almost certainly on the merits. However, in the end this did not matter;
the threat was enough to compel Indonesia to backtrack on needed envi-
ronmental regulation. The inordinate strength of the threat can be traced
to a number of factors, including possibly, as suggested above, an inade-
quate understanding of the applicable law on the part of the Indonesian
authorities. However, other factors which relate to structural characteris-
tics of the dispute settlement processes under BITs and MITs may also
have contributed to its inordinate strength. These include the lack of a
doctrine of stare decisis35 9 and the ad hoc nature of the tribunals which
limits the predictability in arbitral determinations;3'6 the high cost of de-
fending against these suits, which results in a consistent "out-lawyering"
of developing countries by well-financed investors;36' a perceived pro-
business orientation of the tribunals,362 the lack of an effective
person, usually the authority that exercised its de [sic] jure or de facto power to do the 'tak-
ing.' "). Interestingly, the S.D. Myers tribunal was one of the only tribunals to intimate the
possibility that "in some contexts and circumstances" a less than complete and permanent
deprivation of rights might rise to the level of expropriation. S.D. Myers Award on Merits,
supra note 28, para. 283. Given its concern regarding the transfer of benefits that often ac-
companies expropriations, id. para. 287, it may be that such "contexts and circumstances"
occur when a State temporarily or partially transfers the benefits of an investor's rights to
itself or a third party.
358. See Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 28, para. 100; S.D. Myers Award on
Merits, supra note 28, para. 287.
359. See SCHREUER, supra note 129, at 1082, para. 15.
360. See, e.g., Wdlde, supra note 175, at 44.
361. Robert Howse, Professor, University of Michigan Law School, Class Lecture at
University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 17, 2002) (discussing his experience working in
investor-State disputes).
362. Somarajah, ICSID, supra note 83, at 94 (referring to a perception, which Somarajah
finds justified by the situation he describes involving Indonesia, "that arbitral tribunals are
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appeal,3 63 and the possibility of very large damage awards, the impact of
which is greatly increased for a country like Indonesia without large hard
currency reserves.3- Due to the structural quality of these factors, they
resist solution by any one country, demanding comprehensive reform
efforts by the various State parties to ICSID. However, there is open to
Indonesia the possibility of amending, clarifying, or even nullifying the
three treaties on which the threat was based and other similar treaties to
which it is a party, so as to proactively diminish the effectiveness of any
subsequent threats.
All three treaties provide for arbitration between the respective con-
tracting parties should a dispute arise between them regarding the
respective treaty's interpretation and/or implementation .3 " Further, while
formal amendment provisions exist in the ASEAN MIT and Aus-Indo
BIT, but not the UK-Indo BIT,366 according to the rules of customary in-
ternational law, Indonesia and the U.K. are free to amend their BIT by
mutual agreement.363 In addition, should adequate resolution not be had
through negotiated amendment or arbitrated clarification, there are also
arguably sufficient grounds for the GOI to nullify and/or suspend the
treaties.
prone to contort the law in order to ensure the investor comes out best, whatever the situa-
tion").
363. Under the Washington Convention (ICSID), control of ICSID arbitrations is re-
moved completely from the courts. Washington Convention (ICSID), supra note 40, art. 52.
Article 52 only provides for limited grounds for appeal mainly going to procedural errors and
abuses, there is notably no public policy exception-not surprising given ICSID arbitration's
extranational character. See id. art. 52(1). If the annulment panel, drawn from the general pool
of arbitrators, annuls the award, a new tribunal is constituted. Id. art. 52(6).
364.. For example in one award issued in May of 1999 the GOI was found liable for
$391,711,652 to one investor and $180,570,322 to another, for a total of $572,281,974. Him-
puma, Patuha Awards 'Defective,' Counsel for Indonesia Claims, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP., Feb. 2000, available at LEXIS, Legal News, International Arbitration. For reference,
Indonesia's total spending on education in 1999 was $1.9 billion for a population
of 206,264,595. World Bank Edstats, at. http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/
SummaryEducationProfiles/CountryData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=IDN,Indonesia (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2003); Population of Indonesia by Province, at http://www.bps.go.id/
sector/population/tablel.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). Its total GDP in 1999 was $141.3
billion. World Bank, Indonesia at a Glance, at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/
eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/Indonesia+-+Country+at+a+Glance/$File/Indonesia+-+Country+
at+a+Glance.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
365. UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 8; ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IX; Aus-Indo
BIT, supra note 25, art. XII.
366. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. XII; Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XIV; UK-
Indo BIT, supra note 26.
367. VCLT, supra note 90, art. 39.
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A. Arbitrated or Negotiated Clarification
The GOI should seek to clarify provisions in each treaty concerning
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and investment definitions,
either through negotiated amendment or arbitration. Sornarajah ques-
tions reducing a diplomatic dispute to a determination by a type of body
more generally suited for the resolution of private commercial dis-
putes.368 However, if an actual negotiated amendment cannot be reached,
utilization of the arbitration option may be essential. The importance of
following one of these two procedures is demonstrated by the recent
controversy concerning the significance of the interpretive statement is-
sued by NAFTA ministers regarding NAFTA article 1105's fair and
equitable treatment provisions.369 Todd Weiler, among others, has argued
that the "interpretation" was really an amendment and thus invalid for
failure to utilize the procedures for amendment provided by NAFTA. It
is unclear what significance Chapter 11 tribunals will assign to it.3 70 Ne-
gotiated amendment or arbitrated settlement would avoid such a
possibility, both of which effect a binding resolution of the issue be-
tween the State parties.37
368. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 272.
369. N. Am. Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provi-
sions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.org; see Todd Weiler, NAFTA Law in
2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, the Bureaucrats Strike Back, 36 INT'L LAW. 345,
347 (2002); Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter 11, supra note
236.
370. Weiler, supra note 369, at 347.
371. See UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 8 (7); ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IX(2);
Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XII(5). In utilizing the arbitration option the GOI should be
aware of concerns raised by Robert Thompson in discussions with the author, regarding the
constitution of the tribunal formed to hear the dispute. E-mail from Robert Thompson, Former
Secretary General of International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, to Stuart
Gross (July 30, 2002, 11:43 A.M. EST) (on file with author). The UK-Indo BIT and Aus-Indo
BIT both allow for each contracting party to choose an arbitrator, and in the case of the Aus-
Indo BIT, make the appointed arbitrators' choice of a chairman subject to approval by the
parties. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XII(3)(a); UK-Indo BIT, supra note 26, art. 8(2). As
Thompson observed, in this context it would be "essential that the [GOI] ... appoint an open-
minded arbitrator able to look far beyond the narrow confines of the field of investments, since
this is a matter of Public Law." E-mail from Robert Thompson, supra. In the case of the Aus-
Indo BIT provisions regarding the rights to refuse arbitrators' choice of a chairman, Thompson
stated that, "[tlhe Chairman should obviously be a person with a background in Public Law,
and certainly not Commercial law," and, in fact, the GOI should refuse to accept anyone with
such a background, allowing instead the President of the ICJ to appoint the chairman if a pub-
lic law expert cannot be agreed upon. Id. See also, generally, Waelde & Kolo, supra note 229,
at 823 (discussing the likely difference in interpretations reached on the issue of indirect ex-
propriation by "commercial arbitrators" as opposed to those reached by "a court composed of
more statist or environmentalist members"). The ASEAN MIT provides for disputes between
contracting parties to be submitted to the ASEAN Economic Ministers, thus eliminating the
GOI's ability to influence the constitution of the tribunal, as well as likely lessening its need to
do so. See ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. IX(2).
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Through these processes the parties should clarify three essential
provisions. First, it should be made clear that the respective expropria-
tion provisions do not provide a guarantee of compensation for
reductions in economic value of investments that result from bona fide
government regulation of an investment's conduct. Second, the treaties'
respective fair and equitable treatment provisions should be explicitly
defined in terms of an international minimum standard of treatment,
which protects investors against only arbitrary and/or discriminatory
host-country actions. Third, the definition of a qualified investment
should be affirmed to include only those investments which are valid as
matter of host-country law, both in terms of the validity of their estab-
lishment and in terms of the lawfulness of their conduct once
established."' Finally, provisions in the Aus-Indo BIT-which make un-
clear the status of juridical persons incorporated in Australia but owned
or operated by persons of third countries-should be clarified so as to
make provision of protection to such individuals explicitly subject to
both parties' consent.373
B. Nullification or Suspension
Should the above strategies of negotiation and arbitration be unsuc-
cessful, the GOI would have the right to nullify or suspend the treaties,
under either a theory of fundamentally changed circumstances or on
grounds analogous to the lack of certain subject matter in contract law.374
In the case of the ASEAN MIT, this would likely only be necessary if the
GOI recognized a truly imminent threat, as the instrument allows any
party to withdraw upon six months notice. 75 However, in the case of the
other two instruments, significant restrictions exist regarding the timing
of withdrawal, which effectively lock in the contracting States for long
periods of time.376 Therefore, complete nullification or suspension may
be the GOI's only effective method of extracting itself from these in-
struments should it be deemed necessary. Note that the result of either
one of these arguments need not be the complete nullification of the re-
spective instrument, but rather a suspension of it until the conditions of
impossibility are remedied, viz. the treaty terms are clarified as
372. This would make clear that investments tainted by corruption are not eligible for
protection and that an investor who has failed to live up to its side of the bargain in compli-
ance with the conditions of admittance and operation cannot demand the benefits of these
instruments' protections. See generally W'alde, supra note 174, at 28 (noting the weakness of
any investor's claim where the subject of the suit was tainted with corruption).
373. See supra Section IlI.A.l.c.
374. See BROWNLIE, supra note 248, at 616-20.
375. ASEAN MIT, supra note 9, art. XII(2).
376. Aus-Indo BIT, supra note 25, art. XV; UK-Indo BIT supra note 26, art. 11(2)-(3).
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described above.37 Thus, the possibility of such suspensions could also
be effective tactics in negotiations to reach such clarifications.
1. Fundamental Change in Circumstances
Under the VCLT article 62(1), a State party may seek to suspend or
terminate a treaty on the basis of a change of circumstances if an unfore-
seen "fundamental change of circumstances has occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty."'378 This excuse
is limited to situations where "the existence of those circumstances con-
stituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty."'379 Accepting arguendo
that the instruments' expropriation provisions make the GOI liable to
investors for a loss of value to their investment caused by bona fide regu-
lation, the GOI could argue that an essential basis of Indonesia's consent
to such an arrangement was the ability of the central regime to impose its
will anywhere in Indonesia. This no longer exists since the overthrow of
the Suharto regime and introduction of democracy and devolution of au-
thority to the provinces, particularly in the area of natural resource
management.38 ° That this shift to democracy and devolution was unfore-
seen by the Suharto regime which negotiated the treaties was
demonstrated by the leader's continued efforts while still in power to
choose a succeeding dictator and his decision in the twilight of his con-
trol to authorize the use of lethal military force against the students who
called for his overthrow.8 ' The effect of this change in governing struc-
ture fundamentally changes the nature of the obligations which the GOI
agreed to, making the central government now liable for actions over
which they have no control.
2. Contract Analogy
It is well established that "an international treaty ... is 'in the nature
of a contract between nations,' to which '[g]eneral rules of construction
apply.' ,,38' Thus, the GOI could argue for the nullification of the treaties
377. See VCLT, supra note 90, arts. 61(1), 62(3).
378. Id. art. 62(1); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 248, at 620 (affirming its general
applicability as a matter of customary international law).
379. VCLT, supra note 90, art. 62(l)(a)-(b).
380. See, e.g., Undang-Undang No. 22 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemerintah Daerah (Law
No. 22 of 1999 Regarding Regional Governance) art. 7, 10.
381. See, e.g., Suharto Orders Action Against Looters, CNN INTERACTIVE, May 15,
1998, available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/14/indonesia.pm/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2003).
382. Societe Nationale Industriale Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 107
S.Ct. 2542, 2549 (1987) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct.
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on the grounds that the treaties guaranteed an impossibility and so are
void.383 Under both civil and common law systems a contract is void if an
essential element of its performance was impossible at the time of for-
mation.3 4 For example, a contract requiring a human being to fly
unassisted is void. Similarly a treaty containing obligations that are a
practical impossibility at the time of conclusion should logically also be
void.385
On this basis, if these three instruments required through their ex-
propriation and fair and equitable treatment provisions a consistent
application of the rule of law in Indonesia, they guaranteed what was a
practical impossibility at the time of their conclusion and so are void. At
the time each of these instruments was concluded there was not rule of
law in Indonesia but what some have described as "bureaucratic law."
386
Bureaucratic law systems, unlike rule of law systems, contain a vast
body of "indeterminate and often contradictory laws and regulations"
that the bureaucracy "can apply as they see fit. '387 In this context, any
treaty which guaranteed any type of regulatory stability or consistent
application guaranteed an impossibility and so is void.
C. Conclusion
Excluding the negotiated or arbitrated amendment, these options are
admittedly quite extreme, and ultimately might not ultimately be in In-
donesia's best interest. In the context of the relative ubiquity of HAs
these days, foreign investors would likely not look kindly on a country
such as Indonesia which had nullified and/or withdrawn from those HAs
to which it was a party. While it is certainly arguable that a country can
survive without foreign investment and possibly even thrive, it seems
1776, 1783, 1788 (1984)); see also, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Tur-
key), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 68 (Sept. 11); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
S. Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolutions, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 131 (June 21) (Petren, J.); Southwest Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Africa), 1966 IC.J. 6, 84
(July 18); Sullivan v. Kidd, 41 S.Ct. 158, 160 (1921); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 240-41, 1
L.Ed. 568 (1796); United Kingdom House of Lords: In re AI-Fawwaz, 41 I.L.M. 1224, 1231
(2002).
383. See, e.g., SUBEKrTI, supra note 167, at 4-5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 33 (1981).
384. See, e.g., SUBEKTI, supra note 167, at 4-5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 33.
385. In addition, it is contralogical to state that an impossibility existing at the time of
conclusion is not grounds for termination or suspension while an impossibility resulting later
is. See supra Section V.B. I.
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likely that given the current structure and state of Indonesia's economy,
at least some measure of foreign investment would be desirable.
However, as Indonesia's foreign investment law makes clear, it re-
mains Indonesia's sovereign right to determine the types of foreign
investment it admits and the conditions by which it allows investments to
remain. The IlAs which the GOI has concluded leave this authority in-
tact. Indonesia can still unilaterally deny access to any investment it
chooses and is restricted in its conduct toward investments which have
been admitted only so as to be prevented from taking arbitrary or dis-
criminatory actions against them. The decisions of tribunals on the
whole support this, even those based on instruments whose scope, ob-
ject, and purpose are far more protective of investor-as opposed to
host-State-rights than instruments to which Indonesia is a party.
It is hoped that this trend will continue and that those with an inter-
est in the institution of organized international investor-State dispute
resolution will work to reform some of the structural shortcomings men-
tioned. above as well as issues going to its legitimacy like transparency
and public participation. However, in the meantime, countries such as
Indonesia have a difficult choice to make when faced with threats like
those of the mining companies. There are quite strong incentives for
them to concede. That said, when threats such as that of the mining
companies, which could easily have been beaten, are allowed an inordi-
nate effect, the incentive for companies to repeat such strategies is
increased; and as a corollary, host-State regulatory freedom is dimin-
ished. Thus, though sometimes the potential risks can be quite high, it
would be in the long-term interests of countries such as Indonesia to
stand up to such threats and, in fact, push back. At the end of the day
investor decisions are based upon business considerations, and the deci-
sion to threaten arbitration is no different. As long as it is cheap and
effective to make such threats investors will do so. It is the host-State's
obligation to its people to make sure that it is not.
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